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After the Crisis: 
Why Political Science and European Studies 
Need to be Concerned
VINCENT DELLA SALA
Associate Professor of Political Science and PhD Coordinator at the 
School of International Studies, University of Trento
The launch of new intellectual initiatives is always a 
moment of great promise, especially in the case of 
one that aims to showcase the work of graduate stu-
dents. Scholarship pushes forward not because estab-
lished scholars explore new boundaries but because 
the scientific community is constantly infused with 
new generations of scholars and ideas that force us 
to look closely at what we thought we understood. 
The aim of advanced research is not to work closely 
with established experts, finding new ways to repeat 
and confirm established arguments. Rather, it should 
challenge what we know, pushing the scientific com-
munity to look for new frontiers of knowledge. This 
journal is a welcome venue for this venture and ad-
venture.
It comes at a time of great turmoil in politics, at both 
the domestic and international levels. The current 
global economic crisis is both a symptom and cause 
of great transformations in the economic and political 
order of the last half century. This is especially the case 
with the European Union. 2010 was supposed to be 
its breakthrough year. After nearly a decade embroiled 
in a seemingly endless debate about institutional re-
form, the EU could look to the Lisbon treaty as the map 
to guide its way through internal politics and even a 
central position on the global stage. The first signs of 
the global financial crisis seemed to confirm Europe’s 
approach to economic governance and placed it in 
a position to be the model for transnational govern-
ance on a global scale. The Copenhagen summit on 
climate change had the potential to put into relief the 
EU’s global leadership and its normative power. Yet 
as a new year begins, not only were the lofty aspira-
tions dashed, but a serious crisis of confidence has 
sunk into the EU. Even measured political leaders have 
mused openly about the future of the single currency 
and of the EU itself. 
We have read and heard a great deal about the vola-
tile economic climate of the last three years; there is 
no reason to try to repeat it here. But in order for us to 
understand what it means for how we study the EU 
and more generally contemporary politics, it is worth 
while to stop briefly to examine what were its major 
manifestations. While the more enduring effects of 
the last few years are yet to be determined, there is 
a lingering sense that nothing will be like it was be-
fore. This raises a number of challenges for those who 
study the EU. A quick glance at the major journals and 
books in recent years provides scant evidence that the 
EU would run into the problems that it did in the re-
cent economic crisis. Could this be the equivalent for 
EU studies of what the sudden end of the Cold War 
meant for international relations? How did the EU go 
from being seen on the precipice of assuming a role 
as a global leader to the current crisis of confidence? 
More importantly, why did scholarship on the EU not 
see it coming? Political scientists have enjoyed the dis-
comfort of economics in the wake of the economic 
crisis, with its certainty about economic models shak-
en. But we too need to take a closer look at what we 
took as a certainty.
The global economy, and to lesser extent Europe’s, 
had experienced a period of strong relative growth in 
the first decade of the new millennium. Low borrow-
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ing costs, emerging economic powers (China’s admis-
sion to the WTO in 2002 was an important milestone) 
and expanding commercial and financial markets 
were just a few of the factors that led to optimism that 
the new economy would be free of turmoil and insta-
bility. The development of new financial instruments 
was supposed to provide ways to reduce uncertainty 
in markets by pooling different forms of risk. Cheap 
and available credit helped governments struggling 
to keep public finances under control (without having 
to make difficult decisions) just as much as it fuelled 
housing booms in the United States, Ireland and Spain. 
All seemed to moving along smoothly with few signs 
of trouble on the horizon or reported in the scholarly 
journals.
It was easy to see the crisis as primarily an American 
problem when the first signs of trouble emerged in 
2007. American consumers had been on a spending 
binge for most of the decade and its banking system 
had engaged in activities that could be described, at 
best, as highly risky. European banks, often seen as too 
conservative and stodgy, suddenly seemed like solid, 
safe havens. Indeed, more than one commentator 
and political leader began to speculate that Europe’s 
moment had come, with the euro possibly becoming 
the global reserve currency. Yes, the downturn in the 
American economy might cause some disruption but 
few, in the early months of 2008, expected that the EU 
would be shaken to its core within two years. 
There a too many steps and phases between the op-
timism of a few years ago and the aftermath of the 
sovereign debt crisis to mention here. We can simply 
say that there were two phases to the crisis. The first 
was primarily the reaction to the financial crisis in the 
United States in late 2008 and early 2009. What is strik-
ing in this first phase is how the immediate reflex by 
member states, after nearly twenty years of the single 
market and a decade of the single currency, was to 
save national banks and industries. From the unilateral 
decision by the Irish government to protect all of its 
depositors to the French government declaring that 
any aid to automobile manufacturers would be only 
for plants located in France, the logic of even a coordi-
nated European response was lost in the scramble to 
protect national interests. But the problems of this first 
phase were only a hint of what was to come when the 
crisis entered into its second phase at the end of 2009. 
The admission by the newly elected Greek govern-
ment in October 2009 that previous deficit targets had 
seriously underestimated borrowing requirements set 
off a ripple that soon became a wave. What emerged 
was a consensus that there were serious structural im-
balances in the governing of the European economy. 
This refers not only to the flows of capital within the 
eurozone but also to the fact that the single currency 
did not have the political tools to deal with a sovereign 
debt and fiscal crisis. After a decade of arguing over 
the weight of votes in the Council or whether a new 
figure responsible for foreign policy would launch the 
EU as a global actor, Europeans discovered that the 
real institutional reform that they needed was to cre-
ate a means to transfer funds from member states that 
had saved to those that were spendthrift. More impor-
tantly, it was also quite clear that there was little pub-
lic support for such a move amongst those countries 
that had their financial houses in order.
There are a number of lessons that we may draw from 
the last three years that should lead us to think about 
the way we understand the EU and global governance 
in general. First, almost from its first signs in 2008, the 
economic turmoil revealed that economic national-
ism remains part of the cognitive map of policy-mak-
ers in the member states. Conventional wisdom holds 
that the last sixty years dedicated to the creation of a 
European economic space had created levels of eco-
nomic interdependence that negated the appeal of 
economic nationalism. This is a tenet that is widely 
shared amongst policy-makers as well as proponents 
of neo-functionalism and institutionalism. The argu-
ment is based on the premise that integration has 
brought about a transformation in the formation of 
interests so that key actors cannot distinguish national 
economic objectives from those of the EU. The early 
reaction to the first signs of serious troubles across the 
Atlantic challenged these assertions. Member states 
quickly took measures to prop up their own banks 
and issue guarantees to protect their depositors, even 
after agreeing that they would not do so at a summit 
in October 2008. The beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
continued with various stimulus packages that were 
introduced and were very much part of the critique 
of Germany in the second phase of the crisis. This is 
not to say that protectionism has returned to Europe 
but that we need to assess to what extent how much 
“Europeanization” has taken place. Despite twenty 
years of “convergence” criteria, benchmarking, open 
method of coordination and the like, the economic 
crisis laid clear that European economies remain fun-
damentally different with respect to policy outputs 
and outcomes. The fear that it would be hard to hold 
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together a union with so much diversity may become 
more real than many would hope. Convergence was 
seen as necessary not only to avoid the fiscal imbal-
ances of the last decade but also to ensure that there 
would be the necessary political and public support 
for any corrective measures.
Second, central to the post-war European story has 
been Germany’s transformation from being at the 
centre of instability in Europe to its role as the anchor 
of a European polity. This was enshrined in the Maas-
tricht treaty when, in the wake of German reunifica-
tion, the Federal Republic took the bold step of com-
mitting itself to the creation of the single currency, 
thus abandoning the symbol of Germany’s post-war 
recovery. Tied to this narrative of a European Germany 
were the central pillars of Germany’s economy that 
supposedly looked to Europe for accessible markets 
for its goods and services. All this contributed to the 
conventional wisdom that German and European 
interests were indistinguishable. Events over the last 
two years have revealed that perhaps Germany did 
have a national interest after all, and that it might be 
distinguishable from what the rest of the EU wanted it 
to be. Chancellor Angela Merkel was criticized for not 
showing adequate “leadership” (that is, not accepting 
the conventional wisdom of a European Germany) 
and pandering to domestic political pressures. Sur-
veys consistently show that German public opinion 
is opposed to any for of transfers to peripheral coun-
tries facing sovereign debt problems. The German 
media has picked up on this theme, which has served 
to tighten the Chancellor’s room to manoeuvre. Also 
constraining Germany’s ability to seek out new forms 
of economic governance is the increasingly vigilant 
role assumed by its constitutional court, which has 
sent clear and unequivocal messages that any fur-
ther transfers of powers to the EU level would require 
broad consensus within Germany. More immediately, 
it was considered likely that the Court would strike 
down any new structure that smacked of a perma-
nent mechanism to bail out member states in the eu-
rozone. Major changes require re-opening the Treaty, 
and after the battles that eventually led to the Lisbon 
treaty, Germany is not the only member state that 
would have preferred not to kick that hornet’s nest. 
But perhaps the greatest challenge to the notion of 
a Germany firmly tied to and by the EU is that per-
haps its interests are drifting in a different direction in 
a rapidly changing global economy. The percentage 
of German trade that is tied to Europe has been de-
clining steadily the last decade. Moreover, its recipe 
for success in the last decade – wage moderation 
and structural economic reforms – has proven hard 
to implement in many parts of the eurozone. It would 
be difficult to convince German voters that they help 
bail-out their partners after they have been told by 
their leaders that wage moderation and welfare state 
restructuring was the price to be paid for competitive-
ness in the global economy. 
Third, it is early days yet but the all the attention paid 
to institutional change and the Lisbon treaty has been 
disproportionate to its impact. Meant to bring citizens 
closer to the Union and to rationalise decision-mak-
ing, it provided neither during the crisis. If anything, 
what was brought into relief was that the EU institu-
tions were largely on the sidelines, including the ECB 
to a certain extent. More importantly, it also became 
evident that the sorts of instruments to address the 
structural imbalances mentioned above would prob-
ably require yet more treaty reform. They also will, in 
all likelihood, make EU decision-making more opaque 
with even greater distance between citizens and the 
decisions that affect them. For instance, the intro-
duction of a “European semester”, whereby member 
states present their national budgets to their partners 
even before their national assemblies is surely going 
in the opposite direction that was hoped for when the 
process started in Laeken in 2001.
What does all of this tell us for research in international 
politics and especially for graduate research? First, it 
suggests that scholars, like generals, almost always are 
fighting the last war. Our ways of understanding phe-
nomenon are shaped by what has happened, with the 
temptation tick with our cognitive frameworks even 
in the face of different conditions and circumstances.. 
For instance, a constant refrain that was heard during 
the last two years is that European integration has al-
ways been pushed ahead by “crisis”. Even if this were 
the case (and this is a debatable point), it tells us lit-
tle as to why this crisis happened the way that it did, 
at this point in time and because of what factors. In 
other words, it alerts us to the need to be aware that 
we need to find a way to balance contingency with 
structure in our understanding of politics.
Second, the events of the last few years are a useful 
reminder that we should heed Philippe Schmitter’s 
warning that any theory of European integration also 
needs to be able to account for disintegration. Our 
main frameworks for understanding the EU – inter-
governmentalism, institutionalism, and even con-
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6structivism – could not account for the possibility that 
the EU in 2010 was not the same one that the aca-
demic journals had been reporting for the last 15 years. 
We could accept the argument that recent events are 
simply more of the same “muddling through” and that 
this has been the way that the EU has gone ahead 
throughout its history. This means accepting that the 
context in which the main actors have to operate has 
not changed; that the EU’s internal dynamics operate 
in a vacuum unaffected by broader global develop-
ments. This points to the challenge of finding the bal-
ance between the domestic and international levels, 
between the instruments of comparative politics and 
international relations. 
Finally, the global economic crisis, along with the chal-
lenges presented by climate change, energy, food and 
so on, points to the need for this type of journal to 
breathe new life into our understanding of the world. 
It highlights the need to find the balance between es-
tablished ways of thinking and finding venues for new 
ideas that push the frontiers of knowledge. Pushing 
boundaries is always fraught with risk; but I am sure 
that readers of this journal will conclude, upon reading 
the work of young scholars, that it is a risk worth taking.
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The European Union 
readmission policy after Lisbon
MARIAGIULIA GIUFFRE
 PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies
University of Trento, Italy
Introduction
The issue of the return of irregular migrants has be-
come an underlying component of the EU immigra-
tion and asylum policy, which has been progressively 
defined and consolidated after the entry into force of 
the Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaties1. 
The need to create a common European Union (EU) 
return policy has been, then, repeatedly asserted in 
several European Councils with the aim to empha-
sise readmission and return as key tools in the battle 
against illegal migration. This article purports to con-
duct a brief historical excursus on the evolution of the 
EU’s readmission policy from the outset to the current 
developments through the analysis of readmission 
agreements, meant as its main legal instruments. 
Before scrutinising the premises and implications of 
1 Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, entry into force 
on 1 May 1999; Treaty of Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entry into 
force on 1 December 2009.
the consolidation of the EU’s readmission policy, ter-
minological clarifications are needed. The operational 
indicative definition proposed in November 2002 by 
the European Council in its Return Action Programme2 
considers return as “the process of going back to one’s 
country of origin, transit, or another third country, in-
cluding preparation and implementation. It may be 
voluntary or enforced.” Readmission concerns, instead, 
“the act by a state accepting the re-entry of an individ-
ual (own national, third country national, or stateless 
person) who has been found illegally entering to, be-
ing present in, or residing in another state” (Annex I). 
The three actors involved in the repatriation process 
are the State that requests readmission (requesting 
State), the State that is requested to readmit (request-
ed State), and the person to be readmitted (either ir-
regular migrant or rejected asylum seeker, meant as 
an individual who is not in need of international pro-
2 Brussels European Council, 25 November 2002
The author would like to thank prof. Antonino Alì for his comments on the earlier draft of this paper 
and the Faculty of Law of the Lund University for allowing her to conduct 
part of her research on EU readmission policy at its premises.
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This article conducts a brief historical excursus on the evolution of the EU’s readmission policy through the analysis of 
readmission agreements, meant as its main legal instruments. The Lisbon Treaty is herein portrayed as an historical 
watershed in the recognition of both an express competence of the Union with regard to measures aimed to address 
the readmission of irregular migrants, and a new role of the Parliament entrusted with the fundamental power to be 
consulted before a readmission agreement is definitively concluded by the Council.
Finally, while a scrutiny of the close relationship between national and supranational readmission strategies reveals 
the unwillingness of Member States to renounce their national readmission policies, a preliminary assessment of the 
potential role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the field of return of irregular migrants after Lisbon is performed.
8tection).  For the purpose of this study, the term illegal 
is used in relation to a condition and not to a person, 
while the terms irregular (with no regular/legal status 
in the host country) and undocumented (without the 
required papers) migrant are accepted as synonyms 
and extended  to include also persons who illegally 
cross an international border without valid docu-
ments.3
Section I of the article provides a brief historical over-
view on the EU readmission policy, including the in-
stitutional framework, issues of competence, and 
an outline of the main legal instruments; Section II 
canvasses the broad subject of readmission agree-
ments—designed to create a set of procedures and 
obligations between the contracting parties on the 
return of irregular migrants—by revealing how these 
treaties have gained notable importance and visibility 
since the early nineties in shaping the external rela-
tions policy of the EU and in stimulating debate on 
their implications for the human rights of migrants 
subjected to a return decision.4 The primary aim of 
Section III is to shed light on the developments of 
the EU’s readmission policy triggered by the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which strengthens the 
power of the European Parliament in the conclusion 
of such agreements and confer the EU’s explicit com-
petence in the field of readmission. An investigation of 
the tight relationship between national and suprana-
tional readmission strategies is also conducted as the 
EU’s asylum and return policies constitute the general 
framework placed above and beyond the panoply of 
bilateral accords stipulated at an intergovernmental 
level by EU Member States and third countries.
It would go too far comprehensively to analyse the 
complex issue of the impact of readmission agree-
ments on the human rights of returned migrants and 
asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Section IV purports to 
perform a preliminary assessment of the potential 
impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), 
which,after Lisbon, ranks as the primary Union Law on 
the readmission practice of the EU.
EU readmission policy before Lisbon: 
institutional framework and competences
Visa, migration, and asylum are relatively new compo-
nents of European policy-making. While, indeed, the 
Treaty of Rome did not contain any provisions on the 
3 On the concept of “irregular migrant”, see Guild 2004: 3.
4 See generally, (Coleman 2009: 111-138; Marchegiani 
2008; Trauner and Kruse 2008)
harmonisation of these matters, the Maastricht Treaty 
attributed such issues to the intergovernmental co-
operation within the third pillar (Justice and Home 
Affairs) of the Treaty on EU (TEU).5 The Treaty of Am-
sterdam, which constitutes a series of amendments 
and additions to the Maastricht Treaty, shifted immi-
gration, asylum, and civil law issues from the third to 
the first pillar and conferred express power to the Eu-
ropean Community (EC)—as set out in Article 63(3)
(b) of the EC Treaty (TEC) (Title IV)—to address the 
issue of “illegal immigration and illegal residence, in-
cluding repatriation of illegal residents.”6 Decisions to 
conclude readmission agreements—the main instru-
ments used by the EU to facilitate the return of people 
who have entered or stayed illegally in the EU—have 
been adopted on the basis of the mentioned article. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1999 the European Community (EC) has been em-
powered to enter in its own name into such agree-
ments, thus letting Member States expel people, with 
no title to stay, from the territory of the EU. 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), in those cases in which no explicit ex-
ternal competence is mentioned in the Treaty, compe-
tence in external matters, including the power to con-
clude international agreements, can be derived from 
explicit internal competence.7 Furthermore, when EC 
law has created powers for the EC within its internal 
system in order to attain a specific objective, the EC 
has authority to conclude international agreements if 
they are necessary for the attainment of that objec-
tive, even in the absence of any internal measure.8 
Regarding the decision-making process, Article 67 
TEC provided a shared initiative of the Commission 
and the Member States, unanimity in the Council, 
and previous consultation of the European Parlia-
ment. However, with the entry into force of the Hague 
Programme in 2005,9 the decision-making rules have 
been subjected to the initiative of the Commission, 
qualified majority voting of the Council and co-deci-
sion with the European Parliament.10
5 Only two aspects in visa policy in Article 100c were in-
corporated in the Treaty of the European Community (TEC). See, 
(Niemann, 2006: 187)
6 See generally on this issue, (Hailbronner 1998; Monar 1998)
7 This is the so-called principle of parallelism between internal 
and external powers as set out in the ERTA case, 31 March 1971, para 16.
8 Opinion 1/76 [Re Rhine Navigation Case]
9 The Hague Programme, 4-5 November 2004
10 Council Decision 2004/927/EC, 22 December 2004. See 
also, (Peers 2005)
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9In October 1999, the European Council adopted the 
Tampere Programme to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of asylum and 
migration.11 Key elements of the Tampere Programme 
were the creation of a Common European Asylum 
System (Section II), the fair treatment of third-coun-
try nationals (Section III), partnership with countries 
of origin of migrants on political, human rights and 
development issues (Section I), and a more efficient 
management of migration flows, including measures 
to tackle illegal immigration as part of a common 
return policy (Section IV). Both the conclusion of re-
admission agreements and a work of assistance to 
countries of origin and transit to promote voluntary 
over forced return also fell within this programmatic 
framework. The same objectives were, then, stressed 
in The Hague Programme (2005-2010) which contains 
a wide range of initiatives to build up a “strong” return 
and readmission strategy. The measures proposed 
by the Hague Programme include, for instance, the 
“Returns Directive”, the creation of a European Return 
Fund by 2007, the conclusion of Community read-
mission agreements, the development of common 
integrated country and region specific return pro-
grammes, and the appointment by the Commission 
of a Special Representative for a common readmission 
policy (para 1.6.4).12 This five-years JHA Programme is 
aimed to define the premises for both efficiently coun-
tering illegal immigration and harmonizing and con-
solidating asylum and migration legislation through 
a comprehensive approach embracing all stages of 
the global phenomenon of human movement across 
borders, with respect to the root causes of migration, 
entry and admission, integration, and return policies 
(para 1.2). Such a global approach to migration can be 
ensured only through a common analysis of migra-
tory trends in all their aspects by means of a strong 
and coordinated effort between those responsible 
for the development of asylum and migration policy 
and those engaged in all other policy fields relevant 
to these areas (para 1.2).
Likewise, the December 2001 Laeken European Coun-
cil emphasised return policy as a crucial instrument 
in the battle against illegal migration and human-traf-
ficking, and viewed the conclusion of EC readmission 
agreements as a suitable strategy to secure the effec-
tive removal of illegal migrants.13 Subsequently, the 
11 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999
12 See also, (Caritas Report 2007)
13 Laeken European Council, 14-15 December 2001
Commission issued a Green Paper on return policy, 
which focused on forced and assisted repatriation of 
persons residing illegally in the European Union.14
Hardly surprising, a vast range of instruments are part 
of the EU’s return policy, such as the Council Directives 
on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expul-
sion of third country nationals,15 assistance in the 
cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air,16 
Council Decisions on the organization of joint flights 
for removals of third country nationals,17 on financing 
expulsion measures,18 and on the establishment of an 
information and coordination network for Member 
States’ migration management services.19 The return 
policy also encompasses readmission agreements be-
tween the EU and non-EU third countries, which will 
constitute the main object of study of the following 
analysis.
Content and purpose of 
EU readmission agreements
Within the framework of the EU’s return policy, several 
readmission agreements have been signed between 
the Union and third countries as means of facilitating 
the return of persons illegally residing within the bor-
ders of one of the Member States. As a result of the 
April 2002 Green Paper on a Community Return Policy 
on Illegal Residents, readmission was subsumed into 
the common return policy. The main objectives of this 
policy are to fight illegal immigration and expand the 
number of safe third countries around the EU able to 
take the burden of migrants expelled and removed 
from the EU’s Member States. After the Al Quaeda’s 
attacks in September 2001, even more restrictive con-
trol measures have been adopted under Title IV of the 
Treaty on the European Community (TEC) in a climate 
in which migrants and asylum seekers are increasingly 
perceived as a threat to international peace and sta-
bility. If, therefore, EU Member States have attempted 
to elaborate harmonized solutions such as the pro-
gressive creation of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS),20 they have also employed new logics 
14 Green Paper, 10 April 2002, followed, then, by a detailed Coun-
cil Action Plan and a parallel Action Plan on external border control.
15 Council Directive 2001/40/EC, 28 May 2001
16 Council Directive 2003/110/EC, 25 November 2003
17 Council Decision 2004/573/EC, 29 April 2004
18 Council Decision 2004/191/EC, 23 February 2004
19 Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 16 March 2005
20 The aim of the CEAS is to establish common asylum proce-
dures and equivalent conditions for persons in need of international 
protection valid throughout the EU.
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of reinforcement of EU frontiers control, criminaliza-
tion of migrants (Bigo 2004: 61), and acceleration of 
the procedures for returning foreigners who have an 
irregular status to their countries of origin or transit.21
In general terms, readmission agreements are bilat-
eral or multilateral treaties setting standards and pro-
cedures indicating how return of irregular migrants is 
to be conducted. They generally concern the return 
of own nationals or third country nationals, 22 means 
of establishing nationality, time limits for requests for 
readmission, transit arrangements, exchange of per-
sonal data, costs of transport, national authorities in 
charge of cooperating on the removal of immigrants, 
and a “non affection clause” regulating the relations be-
tween the agreement and other international obliga-
tions arising from international law, including human 
rights. The last Section generally lists final provisions 
clarifying both the territorial scope of the agreement 
and the confirmation that it does not apply to the ter-
ritory of Denmark. Nonetheless, a recommendation is 
made that the third-country and Denmark conclude a 
bilateral accord on readmission in the same terms as 
the EU agreement. 
Denmark as well as the UK and Ireland are embed-
ded in a flexible system of “ins” and “outs” in respect to 
asylum, immigration, civil, policing, and criminal mat-
ters. The Lisbon Treaty brings asylum and immigration 
together with all matters on police cooperation and 
on civil and criminal law into a shared competence, 
entitled “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ), 
which was created with the Amsterdam Treaty and 
constitutes now the Title V of Part III of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (Articles 67-89). The 
UK and Ireland have opt-outs from the entire AFSJ 
(Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland in re-
spect of the AFSJ). Thus, they are not bound by any 
legal instrument adopted under the EU’s AFSJ, and 
no judgment of the ECJ interpreting such acts is ap-
plicable to them (Article 2).23 However, in accordance 
21 Between 2005 and 2007, actual removals of unlawful-
ly residing third country nationals within the EU were 756.796. 
Source: Centre for information, discussion and exchange on the 
crossing of frontiers and immigration (CIREFI).
22 In the readmission context, the use of term “third coun-
try national” refers to a person who does not possess the nation-
ality of any of the contracting parties to a readmission agree-
ment.
23 Pursuant to Article 1 of the Protocol on the Application 
of certain aspects of Article 26 TFEU, nothing in EU law affects 
the right of the UK and Ireland to exercise controls over people 
coming from abroad. See (Peers 2009)
with Article 3(1) of the Protocol, the UK and Ire-
land have the possibility to “opt in” and participate 
in the adoption and application of any proposed 
measure, within 3 months of the Commission’s 
publication of a proposal in the AFSJ.24 Unlike the 
UK and Ireland, Denmark is not entitled to either 
“opt in” or participate in the adoption of any meas-
ure under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (Articles 1 
and 2 of the Protocol on the Position of Denmark). 
Therefore, the UK and Ireland have a wider discre-
tion than Denmark in deciding whether and when 
opting in or out a readmission agreement conclud-
ed by the EU. They are not obliged to act together, 
and while so far the UK has participated in all trea-
ties on readmission concluded by the EU with third 
countries—including the most recent one with 
Pakistan—Ireland has only joined the accord with 
Hong Kong. 
While the Maastricht Treaty did not set out any 
opt-outs for the UK and Ireland from EU JHA co-
operation, the Treaty of Amsterdam attached to 
the TEU and the TEC three Protocols establishing 
an opt-out regime for these two countries from 
the following aspects of the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs law: the Schengen acquis, border controls 
measures, and immigration, asylum and civil law 
legislation (Peers 2009: 3-4).
With regard to the pre-Lisbon procedure leading 
to the conclusion of a readmission agreement, only 
the Commission and the Council were involved. 
Following a recommendation from the Commis-
sion, the Council adopted a directive authorising 
the Commission to negotiate a treaty with a third 
country (Article 300 TEC). In performing this func-
tion, the Commission attempted to take a homo-
geneous approach by adopting an informal stand-
ard draft readmission agreement as a model to be 
followed in drafting subsequent accords. The latter, 
along with the Council’s directive, represented the 
content the Community unilaterally relied upon as 
the starting point of negotiations. Since the June 
2002 Seville European Council, the progress in the 
field of readmission and return issues has been 
discontinuous, gathering speed only over the last 
years. At the time of writing (November 2010), the 
Commission has received a total of eighteen nego-
24 For a detailed review on the Lisbon Treaty and the Pro-
tocols affecting the UK, Ireland, and Denmark—which would be 
beyond the scope of this paper—see (Fletcher 2009: 89-95; Chal-
mers, Davies, and Monti 2010: 491-492)
Interdisciplinary Political Studies




tiating mandates from the Council,25 but only twelve 
readmission agreements have become operative (Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Hong Kong, 
Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, 
Sri Lanka, and Ukraine). 
Repatriation schemes leading to a bilateral accord 
have been launched with those countries consid-
ered as a priority for the EU on the basis of a double 
standard elaborated by the General Affairs and Ex-
ternal Relations (GAER) Council in November 2004.26 
The decisive selection criteria are the following: “[first], 
migration pressure on particular Member States, as 
well as the EU as a whole; [second], the geographical 
position of countries, including considerations of re-
gional coherence and neighbourhood” (para 3). These 
factors have been employed by the Community in 
selecting States with which negotiating readmission 
agreements and have been considered by the Coun-
cil as “the most important criteria for determining, on 
a case by case basis, with which further countries re-
admission agreements should be concluded.” (para 3)
The common readmission policy is aimed to pursu-
ing different kinds of objectives. First, the fight against 
unauthorised immigration by facilitating the return of 
nationals as well as third country nationals illegally re-
siding in the territory of the EU through the issuance, 
for instance, of travel documents. In this regard, it may 
be added that readmission agreements for the return 
of third country nationals are usually based on transit 
through the territory of the requested States. Second, 
the establishment of a “buffer zone” of third countries 
responsible both to readmit immigrants from the EU 
and to intercept migrants en route to the EU (Cole-
man 2009: 61). Third, the promotion of readmission 
agreements between third countries themselves (in-
25 In September 2000, the Council adopted a first set of 
directives for the negotiation of readmission agreements with 
Morocco, Pakistan, Russia and Sri Lanka; in May 2001 and in June 
2002 new directives were adopted for negotiating respectively 
with Hong Kong and Macao, and with Ukraine. In November 
2002 the Council added directives for Albania, Algeria, China, 
and Turkey, followed by mandates for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia. In the JHA Coun-
cil meeting of 4 and 5 June 2009, the Council adopted two de-
cisions authorising the Commission to open negotiations with 
the Republic of Cape Verde for the conclusion of agreements on 
facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas and on readmission. 
Finally, on 28 November 2008, the Council gave the European 
Commission the mandate to start the negotiations of the read-
mission agreement with Georgia. Signed in November 2010, it 
will enter into force on 1 March  2011 (See, Table 1)
26 Draft Council Conclusions, 2 November 2004
cluding transit and source countries), thereby broad-
ening the number of States able to receive migrants. 
Further, the EU encourages third countries’ readmis-
sion negotiations through the so-called AENAS Regu-
lation, which enables the Union to fund projects and 
supply technical and financial support.27
     The draft Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome on 
29 October 2004 provided the EU with an explicit 
legal basis for concluding “agreements […] for the 
readmission of third country nationals residing with-
out authorisation, to their countries of origin or prov-
enance” (Article III-267(3)).28 Nevertheless, it did not 
rapidly enter into force because of its rejection by ref-
erenda in France and the Netherlands. It means that 
until December 2009, marking the date of adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam 
has offered the legal reference frame for the conclu-
sion of readmission agreements at the EU level. In-
deed, with the Treaty of Amsterdam the Community 
acquired competence to sign such agreements with 
third countries while issues regarding visa, immigra-
tion, asylum, and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons were transferred from the third 
to the first pillar (Title IV). Pursuant to Article 63(3)(b) 
TEC, “the Council […] shall […] adopt […] measures 
on immigration policy within the area of illegal immi-
gration and illegal residence, including repatriation of 
illegal residents”. Given the lack of reference to “read-
mission” in both the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) and the Treaty on the EU (TEU), the 
competence to conclude readmission agreements 
could be derived from a broad interpretation of the 
term “repatriation”, which is meant to include also the 
readmission of migrants to transit countries (Billet 
2010: 60).
The issue of the division of competences in the camp 
of readmission is not without controversy. On the one 
hand, the Commission has traditionally claimed the 
exclusive power of the Community to negotiate and 
conclude these international bilateral treaties. This 
view is in line with the stance of the Legal Service of 
the Council, which pinpoints how the existence of 
inter-state policies of readmission would risk to create 
potential distortions in an area without internal border 
controls and with free movement of persons where 
readmission policies of other EU Member States can 
be circumvented by secondary movements of illegal 
27 AENEAS Regulation,18 March 2004
28 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed at 
Rome on 29 October 2004. See generally, (Monar 2005: 9)
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migrants to another EU country.29 Moreover, an often 
quoted argument is that the conclusion of an EU re-
admission agreement can have an added value rep-
resented by the political and normative weight of the 
Union in encouraging third countries to accept and 
fulfil readmission obligations.30 Nonetheless, the JHA 
meeting of 27 and 28 May 1999 reconfirmed the issue 
of allotment of competences as an enduring punc-
tum dolens in the path of cooperation between the 
EU and its Member Sates since the latter reasserted 
their unwillingness to renounce national readmission 
schemes:31 competence remained, therefore, shared 
as moulded in more specific terms in the Lisbon Treaty.
The Lisbon Treaty and the relationship between 
interstate and EU readmission agreements 
The EU’s readmission policy constitutes the gen-
eral framework placed above and beyond the broad 
cobweb of formal and informal bilateral readmission 
agreements stipulated by EU Member States with 
third countries. A close relationship between national 
and supranational return policies is undisputable and 
is also corroborated by the fact that Member States 
continue to pursue their readmission procedures in 
parallel with the EU’s strategy. In this vein, also para-
graph 7 of the Preamble of the “Returns Directive” un-
derlines “the need for Community and bilateral read-
mission agreements with third countries to facilitate 
the return process.”
Readmission has, therefore, turned out to be an un-
derlying component of EU immigration and asylum 
policy, which has been progressively defined and con-
solidated after the entry into force of both the Am-
sterdam and the Lisbon Treaties. Also the “Stockholm 
Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizens”, adopted in December 2009, 
portrays readmission agreements as a building block 
in EU migration management.
In the context of a common immigration policy, “the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
adopt measures in the area of illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence, including removal and re-
patriation of persons residing without authorisation” 
(Article 79(2)(c)). The Lisbon Treaty has also modified 
29 Council Doc 665/99, 10 March  1999; see, (Migration 
News Sheet 1999: 1)
30 Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal im-
migration, 14 June 2002, para 76. See also, COM(2001) 672 final, 25
31 Council Presidency Conclusion, 27-28 May 1999
the legal basis for the conclusion of international 
agreements in the field of readmission. Article 79(3), 
indeed, expressly gives authority to the EU to stipulate 
agreements with third States for the readmission of 
third-country nationals who do not or who no longer 
fulfil the conditions for entry, presence, or residence in 
one of the Member States. If the substance of this Ar-
ticle is not new, having the EC already brokered trea-
ties on this subject with eleven countries worldwide 
(Migration Watch UK 2008), the Lisbon Treaty repre-
sents, however, a turning-point in the recognition of 
an explicit competence of the Union with regard to 
measures designed to addressing the readmission of 
irregular migrants. A cross-reading of Articles 207 and 
218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
spells out the procedures to be followed for adopt-
ing an agreement with a third country: as a first step, 
the Council gives a mandate to the Commission to 
negotiate the treaty. Next, after negotiations are con-
ducted by the Commission on the basis of the guide-
lines received from the Council—which appoints a 
special committee for assisting the Commission in this 
task—a compromise is reached and the Council, on 
a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision 
authorising the signing of the agreement. Finally, the 
Commission will sign the agreement in the name of 
the EU as the Lisbon Treaty has eventually endowed 
the Union with legal personality (Article 47 TEU). It is 
also worth observing that EU readmission agreements 
do not require separate ratification by Member States’ 
governments or parliaments.
While, in pursuance of Article 300(3) TEC, the Euro-
pean Parliament was only consulted and its role was 
limited to delivering a non-binding opinion after both 
parties had already signed the agreement, the Lis-
bon Treaty provides that the Council, on a proposal 
by the negotiator, shall adopt the decision conclud-
ing the accord only after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament (Article 218(6)(a) TFEU). This 
new empowerment undoubtedly is one of the most 
important innovations of the Treaty and the fact that 
under Article 218(10), “the European Parliament shall 
be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
procedure” implies the capacity of this body, when 
dealing with readmission agreements, to gather infor-
mation and data during the negotiation process with 
regard to the structure and content of the accords as 
well as their implications for the rights of migrants and 
asylum seekers.  
The issue of division of competences has sparked a 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
heated debate over the years, and Member States 
have openly contested an alleged exclusive compe-
tence of the EU. However, what counts is that the Lis-
bon Treaty does not bestow upon the Union the ex-
clusive power to negotiate readmission agreements 
since Article 4(2)(j) of the TFEU incorporates “Freedom, 
Security and Justice”—which clearly encompasses 
also readmission—in the field of shared competence. 
The relationship between the EU and Member States, 
however, continues to be grounded on the principle 
of “sincere cooperation” enshrined in Article 4(3) of the 
TEU, which reads a follow: 
pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Un-
ion and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obliga-
tions arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts 
of the institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.
Therefore, as supported also by customary practice, 
competence would remain shared with Member 
States, which are, thus, able to continue to conclude 
such arrangements on a bilateral basis. Although the 
European Commission is responsible for the negotia-
tion of readmission agreements, the overall phase of 
implementation, including the decision to return an 
irregular migrant, the issuance of a request of read-
mission and the enforcement of a removal order rests 
entirely with the Member States.32
Previous State-negotiated bilateral agreements are 
still in force and used, but, by virtue of the ‘safeguard 
clause’, EU readmission agreements take precedence 
over State-negotiated ones in case of incompatibili-
ties. When, then, a third country is concurrently bound 
by obligations deriving from readmission agreements 
concluded with both the EU and single Member 
States at a bilateral level, the conflict could be solved 
by referring to the third contracting State. Indeed, the 
third country by accepting the ‘safeguard clause’ can 
be deemed as implicitly renouncing to apply provi-
sions in conflict with the agreement signed with the 
32 Letter dated 23 March 2009 from the European Com-
mission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security to the President of 
Migreurope
EU. Saying that, the treaty concluded at a bilateral 
level continues, however, to be in force (Marchegiani 
2008: 332).
It is often mistakenly assumed that the role of Mem-
ber States is totally dismissed once the Commission 
and the Council independently decide to negotiate 
and conclude an EU readmission agreement, thereby 
overlooking the fact that the mandate of the Commis-
sion only consists in “brokering the agreement” (Cas-
sarino 2010: 18). Indeed, as Karel Kovanda lucidly put 
it in 2006 
EC readmission policies and agreements fall under the 
external dimension. They set out reciprocal obligations 
binding the Community on the one hand and the part-
ner country on the other hand. But once an agreement is 
negotiated, the Community responsibility is over. Its day-
to day implementation, the actual decision about send-
ing a person back and the actual operation it involves—
all this is entirely within the competence of our Member 
States.33
     The JHA Council of May 1999 sustained that a Mem-
ber State must always notify the Council of its inten-
tion to negotiate a bilateral readmission arrangement, 
and can carry on with the process only if the Com-
munity has not already stipulated a treaty with the 
concerned third State or “has not concluded a man-
date for negotiating such an agreement.” Exceptions 
are represented by the case in which Member States 
require more detailed arrangements to compensate 
a Community agreement or a negotiating mandate 
containing only general statements. However, “Mem-
ber States may no longer conclude agreements if 
these might be detrimental to existing Community 
agreements” (JHA Council 1999). To put it differently, 
they “shall exercise their competence to the extent 
that the Union has not exercised its competence. 
The Member States shall again exercise their com-
petence to the extent that the Union has decided 
to cease exercising its competence” (Article 2(2) of 
the TFEU). Should a State contravene this obliga-
tion, an infringement procedure could be brought 
by the Commission to the ECJ under Article 258 of 
the TFEU. To date, no Member State has stipulated 
a readmission agreement with a third country with 
which the EU has already concluded a treaty. Nev-
ertheless, Spain signed readmission arrangements 
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had already concluded a mandate for negotiating 
agreements with these countries.34 If such a prac-
tice may be considered at variance with the principle 
of cooperation in good faith,35 it is also true that the 
Commission, up to now, has never referred the matter 
to the ECJ under the Treaty infringement procedure.
Member States have also a duty to notify the Com-
mission, the Council, and the Parliament their negotia-
tions as well as the current status of implementation 
of their arrangements (either formal or informal). At 
the same time, EU readmission agreements contain 
monitoring mechanisms that could be strengthened 
to guarantee a constant updating on the implemen-
tation process in each Member State. As a general rule, 
the agreements concluded at the EU level sets up a 
Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) comprising repre-
sentatives of the European Commission as well as ex-
perts from the Member States and representatives of 
the partner third countries that should be involved in 
the analysis of the implementation and interpretation 
of the accords. Overseeing how readmission agree-
ments are translated at the domestic level also entails 
the duty to gauge whether governments effectively 
comply with their international and European human 
rights obligations with regard to people returned to 
countries of origin or transit on the basis of readmis-
sion agreements. These EU instruments only provide 
for the inclusion of a so-called “non affection clause”, 
which generically refers to the commitment of gov-
ernments to make the treaty consistent with interna-
tional obligations arising from international law. Ad-
vocates of readmission agreements do not question 
whether these arrangements are consistent with hu-
man rights since they do not provide a legal basis for 
rejection. In their view, human rights considerations 
should arise only when taking the return decision, not 
when enforcing such a decision with the help of a re-
admission agreement (Coleman 2009). Nevertheless, 
concerns have been expressed by NGOs, Internation-
al Organisations, and scholarship with regard to the 
existence of a causality link between the application 
of these accords and the likelihood of human rights 
violations for returned irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers (Council of Europe 2010: 2). Such an approach 
34 While the mandates for the EC agreements with Alge-
ria and Morocco were given in 2002 and 2000, respectively, the 
agreement between Spain and Algeria entered into force on 18 
February 2004 whereas that one with Morocco was signed on 6 
March 2007.
35 See, e.g, Commission v. Luxembourg Case, 2 June 2005, 
para 60.
is consonant with the idea that readmission agree-
ments are part of the whole process of return of ir-
regular migrants that, in each single phase, must be 
consistent with human rights. A thorough investiga-
tion of the compatibility of readmission agreements 
with refugee and human rights law would be beyond 
the frontiers of this article since the argument of the 
dearth of human rights safeguards in the text of the 
accords is open to counter arguments that cannot be 
deeply revisited and articulated within the boundaries 
of this contribution. Nonetheless, in the next section, 
an attempt is made to expound the potential role of 
the CFR in the field of readmission as, with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has become part of 
the core EU legislation.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights:
 a preliminary assessment after Lisbon
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) is a “regional 
supranational instrument” reinforcing the protection 
of migrants and asylum seekers in international and 
European law (Gil Bazo 2008: 33). It sets out a whole 
range of civil, juridical, economic, and social rights and 
has become legally binding with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Since the 
meaning of the rights enshrined in this Convention 
depends on how the ECJ interprets them in particu-
lar cases, it is difficult to assess a priori the impact this 
instrument could have on returned asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants. Nevertheless, it is important to 
realise that the incorporation of the CFR in the Treaty 
of Lisbon expands the power of the ECJ to interpret 
whether both the EU institutions and Member States 
follow human rights standards in making and imple-
menting EU law, respectively (Migration Watch UK 
2008).36 Indeed, while the Charter is certainly applied 
to EU institutions, it is also relevant for Member States 
implementing EU law. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty 
also extends the ECJ’s jurisdiction over asylum and im-
36 It also worth observing that the Protocol on the Ap-
plication of the CFR to Poland and to the United Kingdom states 
in Article 1 that ‘[t]he Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal 
of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regu-
lations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland 
or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.
In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV 
of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or 
the United Kingdom, except in so far as Poland or the United 
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migration policy,37 provides for the gradual introduc-
tion of an integrated management system for external 
borders (Article 77(1)(c) TFEU), and empowers the EU 
to develop common policies for asylum and immigra-
tion (Article 78(2) TFEU). With regard to the legal ef-
fect of the Charter, it ranks now as primary Union Law 
and compliance with it has become a requirement for 
the validity and legality of the EU’s secondary legisla-
tion in the field of migration and asylum. Moreover, 
as established in Article 51 of the Charter, its scope of 
application is limited to the areas in which Member 
States are implementing Union Law and it “does not 
establish any new power or task for the Community 
or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by 
the Treaties.”38 Yet, although the TEU, as amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty, sets out that the Charter will have 
“the same legal value as the treaties”, it does not con-
stitute, properly speaking, a treaty as a matter of in-
ternational law since it is not an agreement between 
States. Indeed, in accordance with the Article 1(a) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty 
is an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its par-
ticular designation.” On the contrary, the CFR has been 
neither signed nor ratified by the Member States, and 
its provisions have not been included in the Lisbon 
Treaty.39  The Charter will have, therefore, the same le-
gal value as the treaties as a matter of Union law but 
its relation with other international human rights in-
struments is not governed by the Vienna Convention 
(Gil Bazo 2008: 35).
Pursuant to Article 52(4) of the Charter, 
insofar as this Charter contains rights, which correspond 
to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision 
37 ECJ’s jurisdiction in immigration, asylum and civil law 
applies equally to all Member States, including the UK and 
Ireland, but only in so far as they have opted into the legislation. 
See, (Peers 2009: 12)
38 Art 6(1) TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty also 
states that the Charter “does not extend in any way the compe-
tences of the Union as defined in the Treaties”
39 The CFR was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on behalf of their institutions at the European Council meeting 
in Nice on 7 December 2000.
shall not prevent Union law from providing more exten-
sive protection. 
According to the “Explanations” relating to the CFR,
 the reference to the ECHR covers both the Convention 
and the Protocols to it. The meaning and the scope of 
the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the 
text of those instruments, but also by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. The last sentence of the 
paragraph is designed to allow the Union to guarantee 
more extensive protection. In any event, the level of pro-
tection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than 
that guaranteed by the ECHR.
It emerges, therefore, that Charter provisions should 
be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
ECHR principles as determined by the jurisprudence 
of the Courts of Strasbourg and Luxembourg. 
Other international human rights tools can be con-
sidered as sources of inspiration for Charter provi-
sions. According to Article 53, 
nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting 
or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of ap-
plication, by Union law and international law and by 
international agreements to which the Union or all the 
Member States are party, including the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitu-
tions.
The reading of the Article 53 indicates how the Char-
ter tends to expand rather than restrict human rights 
protection in the Union by recognising also the rel-
evance of international agreements to which Mem-
ber States are party for interpreting and enhancing 
human rights principles as enshrined in the Charter 
itself.
From this brief analysis of the CFR, conclusions may 
be drawn which are of relevance for showing how 
human rights obligations fall upon the EU and its 
Member States when both drafting and enforcing re-
admission agreements with non-EU third countries, 
which are not necessarily bound by the same interna-
tional and European human rights instruments and 
do not always offer legal safeguards comparable to 
those granted by States within the EU milieu.
15
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This paper conducted a brief historical excursus on 
the evolution of the EU readmission policy through 
the analysis of readmission agreements, meant as its 
main legal instruments. Over the last years, there has 
been a change in the perception of the relations of the 
EU Member States with third countries, which have 
become, indeed, the beneficiaries of compensatory 
measures offered by the EU to enhance their coopera-
tion in fighting illegal immigration. If on the one hand, 
this cooperative framework shows that provisions 
adopted by Brussels can no longer be shaped only by 
domestic security concerns, on the other, the EU’s re-
turn policy and EU readmission agreements continue 
to be viewed by most third countries’ governments as 
responding predominantly to the interests and secu-
ritarian policies of the EU Member States.  
Retracing the main stages of the readmission policy, 
the Maastricht Treaty attributed immigration, asylum, 
and civil law issues to the intergovernmental coop-
eration pillar while the Amsterdam Treaty shifted such 
matters from the third to the first pillar and conferred 
express power to the EC to address the issue of “illegal 
immigration and illegal residence, including repatria-
tion of illegal residents” (63(3)(b) TEC). However, given 
the lack of reference to “readmission” in both the TEC 
and TEU, the competence to conclude readmission 
agreements could only be derived from a broad inter-
pretation of the term “repatriation”. Conversely, the Lis-
bon Treaty modifies the legal basis for the conclusion 
of international agreements germane to readmission 
and expressly grants authority to the EU to conclude 
agreements with third States for the readmission of 
third-country nationals who do not or who no longer 
fulfil the conditions for entry, presence, or residence in 
the territory of one of the Member States (Article 79(3) 
TFEU). In this vein, the Lisbon Treaty represents an his-
torical turning point in the recognition of both a spe-
cific competence of the EU with regard to measures 
addressing the readmission of irregular migrants, and 
the new role of the Parliament entrusted with the un-
derlying power to be consulted before a readmission 
agreement is definitively concluded by the Council.
Although an EU-negotiated treaty can have an add-
ed value represented by the political and normative 
weight of the Union in encouraging third countries 
to accept and fulfil readmission obligations,40 Mem-
40 Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal 
immigration and trafficking of human being in the EU, 14 June 
2002, para 76.
ber States have often expressed their unwillingness 
to renounce their national readmission policies: com-
petence, therefore, has always remained shared, both 
before and after Lisbon. 
Finally, a brief examination of the potential role of the 
CFR in the field of readmission has been carried out 
showing how the incorporation of this instrument in 
the Treaty of Lisbon expands the power of the ECJ to 
interpret whether both the EU institutions and Mem-
ber States follow human rights standards in making 
and implementing EU law, respectively.  As also rec-
ommended by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the EU should ensure that read-
mission agreements and return policies are consist-
ent with relevant human rights standards, including 
the CFR, which, with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, has become part of the core EU legislation. Tak-
ing readmission agreements as a key component of 
the “return toolbox”, further studies should, however, 
be designed to investigate what impact they have on 
the policies of the Member States of the EU as well 
as on the rights of migrants and refugees returned by 
means of these accords to either their countries of ori-
gin or transit.
As already stated, the predominant doctrine deems 
standard readmission agreements are executive in-
struments, which serve to enforce a national decision 
of expulsion or removal and do not provide a legal 
basis for rejection. It is, indeed, in the initial phase 
of formulation of an expulsion decision that human 
rights-related considerations should be made by 
governments. Nonetheless, human rights concerns 
should be taken into account in all the phases of the 
return process, from the issuance of the expulsion de-
cision to the enforcement of such an order. No claim is 
made here to explore in depth the complex relation-
ship between readmission agreements and human 
rights, still an open issue in the doctrine. 
However, as a matter of pubic international law, it is 
particularly important to interpret the value of refer-
ences to human rights and democracy in the pream-
ble of any readmission agreement in order to gauge 
whether they are either mere assumptions on which 
the accord is predicated or real objectives of the treaty. 
A recurrent objection moved to the possible incorpo-
ration of stringent human rights clauses in the text of 
readmission agreements is grounded on the fact that 
EU Member States are already bound by human rights 
principles deriving from international customary and 
treaty law as well as from European law. Therefore, 
16
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
adding in the text of such accords (those concluded by 
either single Member States or the EU) further legal safe-
guards concerning refugees and asylum seekers would 
amount to a superfluous reiteration. These issues remain 
moving targets for analysis, as the political debate within 
the EU is still in a formative phase, and as such they can-
not be explored in full here. Nonetheless, it is of utmost 
importance to clarify that EU Member States and non-EU 
third countries are not necessarily bound by the same 
international and European human rights instruments, 
in particular with regard to the acquis communitaire (in 
primis the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights). As practice shows, 
third countries do not always offer the same legal safe-
guards granted by EU Member States, and the jurisdic-
tional reach of supranational judges will be limited in case 
of violations of fundamental rights committed by read-
mitting countries. Thus, if inclusion of precise safeguards 
for refugees could be a replication for EU Member States, 
it might constitute, instead, a fundamental benchmark 
for third countries. Further, legally binding human rights 
clauses would create more onerous obligations than 
those deriving from general international law. In this case, 
the inclusion in the text of bilateral treaties linked to re-
admission of specific obligations referring to the protec-
tion of human rights and refugee rights would be doubly 
beneficial: if on the one hand, it would increase legal cer-
tainty for both governments involved, it would also be in 
line with Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties which provides that ‘a material breach of a 
bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to 
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty 
or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
In conclusion, it may be observed how both the EU and 
Member States have developed different readmission strat-
egies with third countries of origin or transit of migrants, 
often within the framework of restrictive and securitarian 
policies, which confirm how the debate on agreements 
linked to readmission and their implications for the rights 
of asylum seekers is, essentially, a political debate involving 
national security and identity concerns. Therefore, the real 
danger, in the era of the “war on terror”, is that States start 
to unduly emphasise uncertain and flexible national secu-
rity interests to the detriment of the protection of migrants’ 
fundamental rights. The opportunity to conduct inten-
sive research upon such an issue can be lucidly explained 
through the words of Louis Henkin: ‘how [a State] behaves 
even in its own territory, [is] no longer […] its own business: 
it has become a matter of international concern, of inter-
national politics, and of international law’ (Henkin 1999: 4).
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1. List of EU readmission agreements41
Third country Mandate Date of signature Entry into force
Albania November 2002 14 April 2005 1 May 2006
Algeria November 2002   
Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Cape Verde June 2009   
China November 2002   
Georgia September 2008 22 November 2010 1 March 2011 
FYROM November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Hong Kong April 2001 27 November 2002 1 March 2004
Macao April 2001 13 October 2003 1 June 2004
Moldova December 2006 10 October 2007 1 January 2008
Montenegro November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Morocco September 2000   
Pakistan September 2000 26 October 2009 1 December 2010 
Russia September 2000 25 May 2006 1 June 2007
Serbia November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Sri Lanka September 2000 4 June 2004 1 May 2005
Turkey November 2002   
Ukraine June 2002 18 June 2007 1 January 2008
 41 This table, updated to January 2010, is drawn from the following website: http://www.mirem.eu/datasets/agreements/
index/european-union More recent updates are mine.
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Introduction
Some authors suggest that in 2007 the EU did not yet 
have an efficient minority language (ML) policy (Van 
Bossuyt, 2007; Urrutia and Lasagabaster, 2007). In this 
article I argue instead that, even though minority lan-
guages (MLs have long been perceived as an obstacle 
to European integration, they are now protected by 
the treaties and in some ways even promoted by the 
Commission. Therefore, my argument is that the EU 
has experienced a gradual awareness of MLs, firstly, 
and then also of a broader notion of the protection 
of minorities’ in general. This main contention is there-
fore discussed by analyzing over time the activity of 
the main EU institutions. Of course, such policy is still 
far from being unquestionable; but, however frag-
mented and to a great extent merely complementary 
to that of member States, it does protect and promote 
ML in many ways.
By means of qualitative analysis, I focus on the single 
case-study of the EU and its institutions. The research 
question revolves around ML policy in the EU: histori-
cal development and the state of the art. Accordingly, 
this paper describes how such policy has been con-
structed, discussing a set of hypotheses: the first is that 
the EP played a crucial role in starting and addressing 
this policy. The second is that, MLs constituted a func-
tional area for the development of a more embracing 
notion of minority rights. As a matter of fact, with the 
Treaty of Lisbon the EU has finally recognized linguistic 
diversity and the protection of the persons belonging 
to minorities as part of the EU’s fundamental values. 
The third hypothesis is that the European Commission 
is increasingly active in supporting the promotion of 
MLs through financial programmes – particularly 
those targeting to education and regional develop-
ment – thus becoming the most important European 
actor with regard to MLs. Discussing these three hy-
potheses, rather than providing a cost-effectiveness 
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The issue of minorities has long been perceived as an obstacle to European integration. This paper seeks to unravel 
the complex nature of minority language (ML) policy in the European Union (EU), arguing that a long way has been 
travelled since 1981. From that moment onwards, the European Parliament (EP) began dealing with minority issues 
starting from the functional area of minority languages (MLs). This has led to two outcomes: on the one hand, with 
the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the EU has finally adopted a more embracing notion of minority rights, recognizing linguis-
tic diversity and the protection of the persons belonging to minorities as part of its fundamental values; on the other 
hand, the European Commission is increasingly active in supporting the promotion of ML through financial pro-
grammes. This is evidence that ML policy at the European level, complementary to those of the single Member States, 
is very fragmented and barely structured, but still effective in so far as it legally protects and financially supports ML.
analysis of ML policy, I aim to describe its progressive 
development over the last thirty years, as well as its 
present features.
There are different approaches to tackling ML issues. I 
discuss minority claims starting from the  literature on 
regionalism in Europe (Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 1996; 
Fitjard, 2010). Accordingly, I consider ML policy as part 
of the broader protection of minority rights. For this 
purpose, I particularly rely on the work of  Ò Riagáin 
(2002), Palermo and Woelk (2005), Toggenburg (2000, 
2005, 2006, 2008), and Elias (2009). Overall, this paper 
has an essentially descriptive purpose, mainly based 
on secondary sources such as scholarly texts, papers 
and legal documents which are all analyzed through 
a legalistic approach. Moreover, the research design is 
limited to a specific time span, that is to say from 1980 
up to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), when the major im-
provements in this area of policy were made. 
Accordingly, I try to highlight the separation be-
tween the level of political protection provided and 
the degree of financial promotion available. After 
a brief overview of the European framework for mi-
norities and MLs, where I seek to introduce the main 
arguments, as well as the concept of ML itself, I dis-
cuss the development of the idea that MLs must be 
protected starting from 1981, when the EP decided 
to promote linguistic and cultural rights for minorities 
rather than rights for ethnic minorities per se (see: Ó 
Riagáin, 2002). In this section, I put the activity of the 
EP under scrutiny. In particular, I maintain that it was 
the Parliament that, actually, had the merit of raising 
awareness of the issue of MLs in Europe. Its approach, 
however, has been characterized by a narrower focus 
on the pursuit of ML rights rather than broader mi-
nority rights. Nonetheless, EP activity, although not 
binding, has been crucial in the political protection 
of regional languages. The pioneering work of the EP 
was subsequently endorsed - somewhat timidly- by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), even if it mainly 
focused on ML rights within the context of the free 
movement of workers. These initial efforts, however, 
were almost totally lacking in any binding value. A first 
step in that direction was the path that led to the 2004 
enlargement, when minority rights were included as a 
precondition for EU accession. As a consequence, the 
European Council was actively involved in minority 
protection issues. Furthermore, the principle of condi-
tionality inaugurated a shift towards a more embrac-
ing policy - that is to say from ML protection to the 
protection of minorities in general. This move was fi-
nally legally entrenched in the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), 
which included the recognition of minorities into the 
EU primary law. Before 2009, no single reference to the 
existence of minorities were ever made in the EU pri-
mary legislation. 
Finally, the third part focuses on the financial promo-
tion fostered by the European Commission. Although 
it has no direct legal competence on minority issues 
and language protection, the Commission makes a 
difference in the promotion of ML, financing studies 
and programmes in the critical domain of education 
from which MLs largely benefit. In this sense, the Eu-
ropean ML policy forms part of a “polycentric diffusion 
which characterizes an increasingly large share of pub-
lic tasks and functions” (Palermo and Woelk, 2005: 6–7).
1. Minority languages: 
a functional area for minorities
That of minorities is a fundamental political issue of 
our times. Even though the EU has tried to engage in 
debates on  the protection and the promotion of mi-
norities, this area remains largely within the remit of 
the single Member States. However, there is one field 
within the broader area of minorities where the EU 
has been able to step in and to develop its own policy, 
complementary to that of member states: that of MLs.
1.1 The EU and  minority protection
In the recent years, protection of minorities has be-
come one of the most sensitive scholarly discussions, 
with particular regard to the EU. One way of looking 
at it is that of regionalism, as the revival of regions as 
a counterbalance to the homogenous centralization 
of politics and identity brought about by nation states 
(Loughlin, 1996; Keating, 1998; Fitjar, 2010). Indeed, 
European states are far less homogenous than it is of-
ten thought: Europe is a continent built on diversity, 
where differences go beyond the national borders and 
involve internal differences. a wide range of regions 
and groups. Culturally, regions can be defined as “ter-
ritories marked by the presence of human societies 
sharing histories and cultural/linguistic features that 
are different from that of the dominant culture of the 
nation-state in which they find themselves” (Loughlin, 
1996: 147). Such societies, or groups, are often referred 
to as minorities. As such, they need special arrange-
ments to be protected from the centralizing pressures 
coming from the state. According to the literature on 
regionalism, the EU constitutes a source of potential 
opportunities for the mobilization of ethnic and re-
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gional minorities (Loughlin, 1996; Keating, 1998). 
Indeed, “Looking at the present situation in Europe, 
the law of minorities is constituted by large variety of 
instruments of protection, different sources and inter-
related levels as well as determined by a great number 
of different actors” (Palermo and Woelk, 2005: 6). How-
ever, in reality minority protection is relatively neglect-
ed by the EU. As a matter of fact, the EU has tradition-
ally relied on the work of international and regional 
organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the Unit-
ed Nations and its associated agencies in these mat-
ters. The direct involvement of the EU is very limited; 
in fact, today there is no charter specifically related to 
minorities in the EU legal framework, nor a defined 
understanding of who can be considered a member 
of a minority. According to De Witte, “the emerging EU 
minority protection system rests largely on principles 
that are implicit rather than explicit” (2004: 107).
In spite of lack of legal recognition, repeated referenc-
es to the value of diversity, however broad and vague 
(“highly ambivalent”, to useToggenburg’s words, 2005: 
735), have raised awareness of the protection of na-
tional minoritiesAt the same time, there is strong 
resistance from Member States against the develop-
ment of a effective minority policy at the European 
level. A symptomatic example is that of Copenhagen 
1993, when the protection of national minorities was 
included among the criteria for accession: this partic-
ular criterion, unlike the others, did not acquire legally 
binding value in EU primary law until the ToL. Accord-
ingly, Toggenburg describes the EU approach towards 
minorities as a merely “growing legal reality without 
adding any self standing policy instruments or clarifi-
cations in order to put these legal principles into daily 
practice” (2006: 10). 
Nevertheless, this article discusses one specific (or 
functional) field within minority protection where the 
EU has been seriously engaged, working over time 
towards the creation of an efficient policy: this is the 
case of ML policy. 
1.2 The importance of  MLs in Europe
The shared definition of MLs is that of languages “spo-
ken as a mother tongue by a small number of speakers 
relative to the population of a region or a country as 
a whole which has a different language as its national 
language” (Llamas et al. 2007: 222). In the European 
context, MLs are defined by the Council of Europe’s 
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages of 1992 
as “languages traditionally used within a given terri-
tory of a State by nationals of that State who form a 
group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s 
population; and different from the official language(s) 
of that State” (art. 1). This definition excludes dialects 
of the official language(s), and the languages used 
by recent immigrants from other states. As a matter 
of fact, it only applies to languages traditionally used 
by the nationals of the State Parties: these languages 
may be specific to a region such as Catalan, Basque, 
Breton, Welsh, Sardinian, or they may be languages 
spoken by a minority in one state but which are of-
ficial languages in another EU country, such as Hun-
garian in Slovakia, German in southern Denmark (see: 
European Commission, Booklet, Many Tongues, One 
Family: Languages in the European Union, 2004). 
The concept of MLs is particularly sensitive, since “de-
bates over regional languages are never just debates 
over language” (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 5). The fact 
itself that the official EU terminology interchange-
ably uses a wide variety of synonyms for MLs, such as 
“lesser used language”, “lesser taught language”, “less 
widespread language”, “regional languages”, “threat-
ened languages”, is a sign of the sensitivity of the de-
bate revolving around such a concept. In fact, Europe 
is a place where a variety of MLs have developed over 
time as a result of the revolutions of nineteenth cen-
tury, treaties and migrations: linguistic identity is a key 
factor in the European context (see also: Toso, 2004). 
Today, from Breton to Sámi, Yiddish, Romansch and 
Welsh, there are more than sixty ML in the EU. Moreo-
ver, it is estimated that almost 55 million of Europe’s 
500 million citizens speak a ML other than the ma-
jority language of the state in which they live (data 
from Mercator European Research Centre, 2010; see 
also: European Commission, Many Tongues, One Fam-
ily: Languages in the European Union, 2004; EU Com-
missioner for Education, Culture and Multilingualism, 
website, 2006; and Toso, 2004)). MLs are spoken in all 
EU countries; and in some cases, they count even more 
speakers than some EU national languages. For exam-
ple, Catalan counts approximately 6 million speakers, 
whereas Finnish and Danish have 5 million each (Net-
work for Multilingualism and Diversity in Europe, 2006). 
All in all, ML represent an extremely significant issue in 
the European context.
Consequently, ML policy is aimed at the preservation 
and the promotion of cultural and linguistic plurality 
with particular regard to ML groups. In fact, it is one 
specific field of language policy, which is defined as “a 
systematic, rational, theory-based effort at the societal 
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level to modify the linguistic environment with a view 
to increasing aggregate welfare” (Grin and Kuzmany, 
2000: 7). Accordingly, the purpose of the EU’s ML pol-
icy is to guarantee to all the European citizens that 
“they could speak and act together at European level 
and thus achieve results, which individually would 
have remained beyond their capabilities” (Ó Riagáin, 
2002: 7). This concern was very much present also in 
the foundations of the European Community: not by 
chance, as noted by Elias, the drafters of the Treaty of 
Rome “were acutely aware of the need to preserve 
some semblance of linguistic parity, and therefore 
political parity, when they conferred equal status on 
all national languages of the EU member states (with 
the exception of Irish and Luxembourgian) as working 
languages” (2009: 269). 
Despite such fundamental preoccupations with lin-
guistic identity, European institutions did not directly 
address concerns about ML rights until the beginning 
of the 1980s. Indeed, at the very beginning of the 
common market, MLs were perceived as an obstacle 
to the free movement of goods and people. It was 
only with the initial efforts of the European Parliament, 
in the 1980s, followed by the other institutions, that a 
ML policy was made possible. In fact, “a unified Euro-
pean approach to minority language rights has only 
emerged recently, during the last twenty years” (Elias, 
2009: 269). 
2. The struggle for recognition:
political protection for minority languages
I begin this section of the paper discussing my first hy-
pothesis: the EP as the institution which has contrib-
uted the most to raising awareness on the issue of ML 
at the European level. Its pioneering work between 
1981 and 1994 shaped the debate and led the EU to-
wards an embryonic ML policy. It also established a 
path dependency, so that MLs came to be considered 
a functional area for the broader protection of minori-
ties as such. To put it in Ó Riagáin’s words, “the support 
for lesser used languages, emanating from the institu-
tions of the European Community during the 80s and 
the first half of the 90s, raised, not only the morale of 
those working to conserve and promote lesser used 
languages, but also their hopes and expectations” 
(2002: 7).  This narrative was embraced also by the 
ECJ, which timidly endorsed the development of a ML 
policy. However, while the work of the EP consisted of 
soft-law resolutions, the European Council had an op-
portunity to develop hard-law instruments, binding 
acceding members to “respect for and protection of 
minorities”, as established at the Copenhagen meet-
ing of 1993 (Copenhagen Council Conclusions). These 
criteria were applied in general through the principle 
of conditionality during the process for enlargement 
of 2004. Building on these developments, the ToL fi-
nally included the respect of minorities among the 
fundamental values on which the EU is founded, thus 
translating this issue into the primary law of the EU. 
Accordingly, not only does the ToL contribute to the 
development of ML protection, but it also embraces 
a more inclusive approach to minority rights, as the 
result of a functional approach which started from the 
specific area of ML. This is the second hypothesis I dis-
cuss in the concluding part of this section.
2.1 The pioneering work of the Parliament
So far, the EP has adopted four major resolutions on 
the ML of the EU (which, until 1992, was still the EC): 
those of Arfé (1981 and 1983), Kuijpers (1987) and 
Killilea (1994). Within the EP, a significant role in deal-
ing with the issue of ML has been played by two col-
lective actors. The first is the Intergroup for Minority 
Languages (IML), which is one of the longest stand-
ing Intergroups committees within the EP since it was 
officially recognized in 1983. The second actor is the 
Committee on Culture and Education (CULT), which 
is responsible, among other things, for “the protec-
tion and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity” 
(CULT’s website, 2010). All the resolutions concerning 
MLs were, in fact, inspired by reports and recommen-
dations either by the IML or by the CCT. However, it 
is worth remembering that resolutions are soft law 
sources: they are not legally binding. 
The EP first addressed the topic of MLs at the begin-
ning of the 1980s, issuing two resolutions based on 
two reports tabled by the Italian MEP Gaetano Arfé. 
The 1981 “Resolution on a Community Charter of re-
gional languages and cultures and on a charter of 
rights of ethnic minorities” first urged the right to use 
MLs in dealings with official bodies and Courts; it also 
proposed to promote teaching in MLs and to ensure 
MLs access to local media. This resolution is funda-
mental, since it shaped the EU’s minority policy for the 
following 20 years. As noted by Ó Riagáin (2002: 4-5), 
during the preparation of the motion for the resolution 
a fundamental debate took place, revolving around 
the best approach for addressing the needs of MLs. 
It put a trade-off between rights for ethnic minorities 
per se or solely linguistic and cultural approach. In the 
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end, this debate pitched those in favour of the rights 
of ethnic minorities per se against those prepared to 
adopt a solely linguistic and cultural approach. From 
that moment on, the EU pursued ML rights rather than 
broader minority rights. Such an approach was, in fact, 
followed by the Arfè “Resolution on measures in favor 
of minority languages and cultures” of 1983, which 
led to the opening of a budgetary line for MLs, and 
the 1987 “Resolution on the languages and cultures 
of regional and ethnic minorities”. These three resolu-
tions, while broad in their terms and lacking binding 
force, set the stage for the innovations contained in 
the Treaty reform of 1992, which in fact recognized 
for the very first time European “cultural and linguistic 
diversity” (art. 126 TEU). The Killilea resolution of 1994 
acknowledged this progress and urged EU Member 
States to take the ML issue more seriously, calling for 
a ratification of the European Charter of Minority Lan-
guages.
Meanwhile, in 1993, the European Council held in Co-
penhagen established that “respect for and protection 
of minorities” was one of the compulsory criteria for 
accession (Copenhagen Council Conclusions). Such a 
criterion became fundamental ten years later, when 
the European Council used it for the actual implemen-
tation of the protection of minorities, as explained in 
section 2.3.
2.2 The timid endorsement of the 
European Court of Justice
According to Elias (2009: 297-298), the ECJ is part of 
the development of a ML policy in so far it shifted 
advancing from toleration-oriented language rights 
(rights that are protections individuals have against 
government interference with their private language 
choices) to promotion-oriented language rights 
(rights that individuals have to the use of a particu-
lar language in public institutions — in the courts, 
the legislature, public schools, the delivery of public 
services, etc). Such a distinction, proposed by Kloss 
(1971, pp. 259–262), suggests that the ECJ embraced 
over time a perspective which contributed to giving 
strength to the resolutions of the EP and to creating 
the basis for subsequent developments.
As stressed by Palermo, “The phenomenon of mas-
sive intervention of the ECJ in shaping the concrete 
contents of European law is well known, being part of 
the overall expansive tendency of the role of courts in 
modern societies (judicial creativity, or judicial activ-
ism). This is even more evident when examining the 
tendency of the ECJ to include fields within the scope 
of the Treaty that were originally excluded from it: a 
phenomenon that can be called ‘judicial spill-over’” 
(2006: 22). However, until the ToL there was no legally 
binding reference to minorities in the EU framework: 
therefore, the ECJ never had the chance to deal with 
minorities. The lack of Community competence in this 
field prevented the ECJ to rule on substantial issues re-
lated to minority protection. The only exception was, 
in fact, the matter of linguistic rights (Van Bossuyt, 
2006: 4): . Iin contrast to the rights of minorities in gen-
eral, “the ECJ has left its marks on the language rights 
of minorities within the European Union. It should, 
however, be noted that these judgments have been 
pronounced in the framework of the free movement 
of persons and the freedom to provide services” (Van 
Bossuyt, 2006: 9 – 10).
This was evident already in Mutsch (1985), when the 
ECJ had to rule for the first time on the use of lan-
guages before national courts. After that, the ECJ 
ruled again on issues concerning MLs in three other 
key cases: Groener (1989), Bickel & Franz (1998) and An-
gonese (2000).1 However important for the protection 
of linguistic rights, these rulings never clarified the 
concept of MLs, not least because the ECJ focused on 
the importance of the protection of linguistic rights in 
the context of the free movement of workers rather 
than on the protection of ML as such. Accordingly, 
Palermo stresses that  “if member states want to ef-
fectively protect their special legislation on linguistic/
cultural diversity, and therefore to affirm their internal 
pluralism, they must provide the EU with at least some 
competence in this regard. By doing so, they will en-
able the ECJ to take into consideration and to balance 
not only economic freedoms, but also the protection 
of diversity as an European value” (2006: 25). This ar-
guments makes the developments brought about by 
the ToL particularly relevant, as it will be discussed in 
section 2.4.
2.3 Enlargement as an opportunity for the 
European Council
The enlargement of 2004 meant a shift in the narra-
tive of ML protection in the EU. It implied some ma-
jor innovations, starting from the fact that the main 
institutional actor involved in ML protection became 
1 I do not intend to go into the details of each single rul-
ing here. For those interested, both Van Bossuyt (2006) and Elias 




Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
the European Council, through its exercise of the prin-
ciple of conditionality vis-a-vis new Members. More 
precisely, cooperation with acceding countries im-
plied the “respect for and protection of minorities” as 
established at the Copenhagen meeting of the Euro-
pean Council (Copenhangen Council Conclusions). 
More specifically, acceding countries from Western 
Balkan states were bound by some provisions which 
stressed the “[r]ight to establish and maintain […] [a]
dequate opportunities for […] minorities to use their 
own language before courts and public authorities” 
(Luxembourg Council Conclusions, 1997: annex III, 
quoted in Toggenburg, 2008: 6). In some cases, “pro-
moting language training [...] in particular for resident 
persons belonging to minorities” was considered a 
binding element (see: Lithuanian agreement art. 78, 
quoted in Toggenburg, 2008: 6). This created a dou-
ble-standard: while the European Council was able to 
bind acceding members, the EU had limited author-
ity in cultural matters towards those which are already 
Member States. In fact, while Lithuania was obliged to 
protect its Russian speaking minority to gain access to 
the EU, no enforceable instruments were used to bind 
France, Italy or Belgium to respect their ML communi-
ties. However, even though these provisions did not 
apply to Member States, they made clear that minor-
ity rights are a binding precondition for the eligibility 
for the Council assistance. 
Consequently, the instruments used in this phase of 
European integration were no longer soft resolutions, 
but hard law obligations for acceding countries. Fur-
thermore, this development also reflected a shift in the 
European perspective over MLs. According to Toggen-
burg (2008), theEU’s emphasis shifted from a cultural 
perspective to a broader perspective including the issue 
of the political participation of minorities. This develop-
ment anticipated the innovations of the ToL, which fi-
nally embraced a broader concept of minorities, going 
beyond the (undeniably hegemonic) narrow focus on 
ML groups.  In this sense, the 2004 enlargement was a 
means to further develop the EU’s minority policy and 
anticipate some of the developments which would 
have later been recognized by the ToL. 
2.4 The Treaty of Lisbon: 
achieving a more encompassing policy
Of course, the EP continued to play a role shifting its 
focus from MLsto minorities in a more inclusive light. 
After a 2003 resolution “with recommendations to the 
Commission on European regional and lesser-used 
languages — the languages of minorities in the EU — 
in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity” 
based on the report tabled by Italian MEP Michl Ebner, 
in 2005 the EP put forward a resolution “on the pro-
tection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies 
in an enlarged Europe”. Together with a 2006 resolu-
tion, sponsored by the Latvian MEP Tatjana Zdanoka, 
on “non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all 
– a framework strategy”, these developments did not, 
for the very first time, directly target MLs, as they took 
into account ethnic minorities, as well as new minori-
ties such as the Roma. 
The ToL builds on these developments, strengthening 
the EU legal framework for minorities in general and, 
more specifically, for ML. Consequently, its most im-
portant feature is the legal recognition of minorities: 
the ToL refers to the “respect for the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities” (art. 2 TEU). Therefore, the ToL 
not only recognizes the existence of persons belong-
ing to minorities, but it goes further, establishing re-
spect for them as one of the values on which the EU 
is founded. A more specific provision for the protec-
tion of MLs is to be found, instead, in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which is annexed to the ToL and 
thus legally binding under the framework of the EU 
primary law. The Charter “prohibits any discrimination 
on any ground such as […] language [...] membership 
of a national minority” (art 21.1). Such a provision re-
flects article 3 TEU (formerly art. 126), which contains 
a legal duty to respect the European “rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity”. All in all, the ToL is an important 
step forward, since it brings in a number of provisions 
which were not officially recognized before.
As stated by Toggenburg, “this might not be all too 
astonishing and most probably does not add much 
to the general principle law of equality under current 
EU law” (2008: 13). Certainly, it does not add much 
to the field of ML policy. In fact, it disappoints for its 
weakness, lacking both an indication on self-standing 
policy instruments and clarity that would help put-
ting principles into practice. For instance, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights insists on the non discrimi-
nation for linguistic diversity, but it does not specify 
what kind of linguistic diversity should be respected.
However, it would be misleading to dismiss the ToL 
as a failure. While MLs have long been perceived as 
a threat vis-a-vis the European project of integration 
(see, for instance, Toso, 2006: 51) and an obstacle to 
the achievement of the internal market, the ToL final-
ly affirms that the EUis based on values such as the 
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“rights of persons belonging to minorities” (art. 2 TEU) 
and on its “ rich linguistic and cultural diversity” (art. 
3.3 TEU). 
The main strength of the ToL is, in fact, symbolic: the 
recognition of the value of minorities within the EU 
legal framework reflects a very strong pro-minority 
message. To put it in Shuibhne’s words, “If asked ‘Have 
recent times produced key European Union (EU) devel-
opments for the status of minority languages?’ an ob-
server’s instinctive answer would most probably bean 
abrupt, quite simple, ‘No’. On reflection, however, more 
has been going on than might at first be presumed, 
but with somewhat mixed results” (2008: 123). Toggen-
burg himself admits that, despite being weak, the ToL 
represents “a major shift”, since the term “national mi-
nority” itself enters into EU’s primary law (2008: 13). 
Moreover, this development is likely to give strength 
to organizations and actors lobbying for a stronger ML 
policy. Accordingly, the symbolic force of the ToL could 
create the basis for further developments.
This fundamental development coincides with a 
significant stretching of the concept of minorities. 
The ToL officially recognizes minorities as not mere-
ly linked to language. Rather, it introduces a much 
broader understanding, which is not directly linked 
to any particular marker, such as language, territory of 
ethnic belonging. This might constitute a weaknesses 
in that it is generic; at the same time, all the minority 
groups (and not only linguistic groups) are potentially 
capable of being affected. This constitutes a shift from 
the initial narrow focus on MLs adopted by the EP, 
when in 1981 it began dealing with minorities. Such 
an approach has been followed for a long time due 
to a path dependency: MLs were naturally considered 
the way to deal with minorities in general. Function-
ally, MLs have proved to be an effective starting point 
towards a more embracing notion of minorities: the 
EU now recognizes in its primary law the fundamental 
values of minorities as such, without a specific con-
nection with language or any other specific marker of 
identity.
3. The means for promotion: 
!nancial means for minority languages
The Commission is the most important actor in the 
financial promotion of ML, particularly in the critical 
domain of education. As a matter of fact, from 2004 
the European Commissioner for Education and Cul-
ture portfolio included an explicit reference to lan-
guages, thus becoming European Commissioner for 
Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism; the 
name was changed in 2007 (European Commissioner 
for Multilingualism), and again in 2010, finally becom-
ing Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingual-
ism and Youth. European Commissioners have often 
always shown a clear willingness to mainstream ML 
policy into the work of the EU; in 2002, Viviane Red-
ing, then Commissioner for Education and Culture, 
stressed that “the European Union should build on 
the structures, networks, projects, initiatives, know-
how and good will generated by the year to develop 
a coherent long-term strategy for linguistic diversity 
and language learning” (The future of regional and mi-
nority languages in the European Union, conference, 
Helsinki, 11 October 2002).
However, the Commission can function only in the 
fields where it has competence in the scope of the 
Treaties; and, in fact, it does not have direct legal com-
petence in the field of the protection of language mi-
norities. Therefore, the Commission can influence ML 
only indirectly, through functional intervention based 
on a variety of sources: the chapter on ‘Culture’ in the 
Maastricht Treaty; the Copenhagen membership cri-
teria; the anti-discrimination Article 13 of the Amster-
dam Treaty; and, finally, the programmes for regional 
development or cross-border cooperation. In this way, 
even if not explicitly invested of such competence in 
the Treaties, the Commission actively promotes MLs 
in the field of education, through study programmes 
and specific researches.
3.1 Education: minority languages in 
schools and universities
An area where the Commission is particularly active 
is that of training and transnational exchanges. The 
aim is to promote MLs in the official school curricula 
through CDs and the internet, alongside projects that 
raise awareness on MLs. For instance, Comenius, a 
Commission programme which provides language 
courses and intercultural education for teachers and 
other staff, gives priority to those school teachers re-
questing training in a ML. 
Less directly – but not necessarily less effectively – the 
Commission promotes MLs through mobility, transna-
tional partnerships, youth exchanges, town twinning 
projects, and the European Voluntary Service. Such 
programmes can be used for supporting ML commu-
nities culturally, socially of economically. Erasmus, for 
instance, can involve training for MLs, such as Celtic, 
Catalan or Flemish. Those students going to a country 
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where MLs are spoken are eligible for an intensive lan-
guage course before the study period. Moreover, Er-
asmus raises awareness on ML communities through 
cultural exchanges of young students. A similar task 
is carried out by the Study Visit Programme, the Eu-
ropean Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL)’s 
programme for the promotion of ML. All in all, these 
programs are vehicles for facilitating and fostering 
networking and information exchange.
3.2 Scienti!c research: 
investigating minority languages
A second field of activity for the Commission is that 
of financing a dense network of agencies and institu-
tions aimed at studying ML communities in Europe. 
Such ninitiatives were proposed by the 1983 Arfé res-
olution, which called upon the Commission “to con-
tinue and intensify its efforts in this area, particularly 
in relation to establishing pilot projects and studies” 
(Resolution on measures in favor of minority languag-
es and cultures).
First of these is the EBLUL, that was set up to promote 
linguistic diversity and languages. It was founded 
in 1982 and, though independent, it largely relies 
on funds from the European Commission (together 
with the Council of Europe and regional institutions). 
Among its activities are scientific publications, a news-
letter (Contact-Bullettin) and promoting the contacts 
between ML communities and the European institu-
tions.  The second institution founded was the Mer-
cator Centre, which was set up in 1988 following the 
call in the 1987 Resolution on the languages and cul-
tures of regional and ethnic minorities for the Com-
mission “to give the necessary attention to linguistic 
minorities in the Community’s information publica-
tions”. Mercator is an information and documentation 
network which aims at improving the exchange and 
circulation of information on MLs and cultures, provid-
ing the general public as well as people with special 
interests with up to date and reliable information on 
the situation of the linguistic communities. Together 
with EBLUL, it seeks to encourage cooperation and 
networking between institutions and organizations, 
universities, local, regional and national authorities. Fi-
nally, since 1992 the EU has supported a series of stud-
ies on MLs, collectively known as Euromosaic. A series 
of subsequent researches were published in 1995 and 
then in 2004 and 2009, with the purpose “to find out 
about the different regional and minority languages 
in existence and to establish their potential for pro-
duction and reproduction, and the difficulties they 
encounter in doing so” (Euromosaic Study’s website). 
Through these strategic studies the Commission pro-
motes debate, innovation, and the exchange of good 
practice. 
3.3 Regional programmes:
investing in culture and customs
A third field of activity for the Commission, already 
mentioned in the 1987 Resolution on the languages 
and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities is that 
of financing the indigenous potential of MLs through 
structural funds, such as the European Regional De-
velopment Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund 
(ESF).  
The ERDF supports economically underdeveloped re-
gions; as many ML communities live in such regions, it 
indirectly protects their diversity. For instance, Interreg 
III, a programme for promoting cooperation between 
regions as part of the ERDF, “holds definite potential 
for ML communities who find themselves in adjoining 
regions but in different jurisdictions” (Ò Riagáin, 2002: 
11). The obvious examples are the Basques and Cata-
lans in Spain; but also the small Greek community in 
Puglia has availed of the programme in a manner that 
strengthens its identity and culture. 
The other structural fund, ESF, is set up to reduce dif-
ferences in prosperity and living standards across EU 
Member States and regions, thus promoting eco-
nomic and social cohesion. Much of the fund is used 
to train workers; as the cultural sector has consider-
able potential in terms of economic development, ML 
communities can avail of ESF funding to develop their 
economies in ways that are of benefit to their lan-
guages and their attendant cultures (Ò Riagáin, 2002: 
11-12). An examples is the case of Sámi language 
and culture, whose promotion is financed by the EU 
according to the framework of the European Social 
Fund, objective 1 (see also: Second Periodical Review 
of the ECRML: Finland, 2003). 
Conclusions
In this article I have discussed past and present devel-
opments of the EU’s approach towards MLs, arguing 
that some European institutions have been more ac-
tive than others in pushing forward the issue of mi-
nority protection (hypothesis 1 and 3). The historical 
analysis shows that the EP played a pioneering role in 
the 1980s, raising awareness and setting the agenda 
for successive developments. Subsequently, the Eu-
27
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
ropean Council exercised an important role when, 
in 2004, it imposed the principle of conditionality to-
wards acceding countries, with a particular focus on 
the respect of minorities. While the involvement of 
the ECJ remained timid – the Court never clarified the 
concept of MLs, narrowly focusing on the protection 
of linguistic rights in the context of the free move-
ment of workers – the European Commission has 
progressively become the most important European 
institution in this field, financing study programmes 
and scientific studies.
Moreover, MLs have been significantly developed in 
the Treaties (hypothesis 2). Accordingly, the ToL rep-
resents a fundamental evolution, since it officially 
recognizes the importance of minorities (art. 2 TEU) 
and it adds the European “rich linguistic and cultural 
diversity” (art. 3.3 TEU) among its fundamental values. 
Such a broad understanding of minorities results from 
the progressive development of the area which mo-
nopolized the issue of European minority protection 
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The political economy of Turkey-EU customs 
union after the treaty of Lisbon:
A Reappraisal
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This work stems from a research-period spent in the Summer 2010 at the International Strategic Research 
Organization (USAK) in Ankara, Turkey. Along with Dr. Mustafa Kutlay, the author took part to a research-
project aiming at evaluating the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the overall relations between Turkey and the 
European Union (EU). The analysis outlined in this research-work and the preliminary results presented are the 
outcome of a series of round-tables with major Turkish political economy experts and policy-makers as regards 
the current status and future sustainability of Turkey’s Custums Union (CU) with the EU. 
Introduction
The goal behind the present work is two-fold: on the 
one hand, it points at investigating the possible ef-
fects that the Treaty of Lisbon might have on Turkey-
EU trade relations, while on the other hand it aims to 
stimulate a theoretical debate on a topic lacking suffi-
cent attention, especially in Turkey’s academia. In fact 
the aim of the discussions held at USAK from May to 
July 2010, was to give a preliminary, and by no means 
exhaustive, answer to the following question: “How 
the new commercial policy shaped by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (ToL) would affect the CU established in 1996 
between the EU and Turkey ?”
In order to articulate a coherent argument and sum-
marize the diverse positions arisen during the round-
tables, this article tackles three relevant aspects con-
cerning the status of Turkey-EU trade relations. Firstly, 
the paper shows how the ToL  modifies and affects 
current EU trade policy. Given the high level of techni-
cality surrounding the topic, the article offers a short, 
but clear and detailed explanation of the institutional 
novelties introduced by the ToL to the EU’s trade pol-
icy. Secondly, the focus shifts to the existing institu-
tional arrangement binding Turkey to the EU trade 
policy. The nature of and the constraints posed by the 
CU are outlined in order to understand how the CU 
affects economic relations between EU and Turkey. Fi-
nally, the author articulates the main points emerged 
throughout the research-project to discuss different 
claims and perspectives on the evaluation of the im-
pact of the EU’s new trade policy on the existing CU.
The article develops through the following structure. 
In the first section, the changing nature of the EU’s 
trade policy is analyzed, stressing the gradual shift 
towards a more bilateral and Free Trade Agreements-
based (FTAs) approach, to contextualize the nature of 
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This article analyses the European Union’s (EU) trade policy highlighting the gradual shift towards a more penetrat-
ing EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) policy and institutional changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and their 
impact on trade policy’s functioning. Emphasizing Turkey’s changing trade patterns and stressing the growing sali-
ence of non-EU trade partners, the article opens up a debate on the rationale of current Customs Union. The analysis 
brings to the understanding of the on-going cases of trade deflection negatively affecting Turkish economy and the 
drawbacks arisen from the EU’s changing FTA policy. Finally, the political and technical aspects of Turkey’s accession 
process are discussed to shed further light on the current and future meaning behind today’s Customs Union. 
the institutional changes brought about by the ToL. 
The second section provides a brief but detailed de-
scription of the funcgtioning of the EU’s trade policy, 
and afterwards focuses on the novelties introduced 
by the ToL and their impact on EU commercial policy. 
In the third section the CU’s origin, economic achieve-
ments and structural weaknesses are pointed out in 
order to outline the overall framework of Turkey-EU 
trade relations. In the fourth and final section the ten-
tative conclusions from the round-tables on the pos-
sible benefits and drawbacks of the EU’s new trade 
policy vis-à-vis the existing CU are dicussed. This part 
is originally thought to open possibilities for further 
researche among Turkish scholars to deepen the 
analysis of the current rationale behind the CU and 
to stimulate public debate on the topic. In a similar 
fashion this paper endeavours to draw the attention 
of the European scholarship on a less-known area, 
in particular for those interested in the EU’s relations 
with Turkey. 
EU’s Trade Policy Strategy 
before the Treaty of Lisbon
Until 2006 the EU has thoroughly championed a 
multilateral approach in dealing with international 
economic matters. However, the year 2006 marked a 
profound change in attitude, in line with the recon-
figuration of trade politics at global level. The shift 
experienced by the EU towards the use of bi- and 
plurilateral agreements, and the benefits arising from 
this change in paradigm, might be better understood 
by taking into account several factors. The rise in the 
economic and bargaining strength of fast-growing 
emerging markets has gradually altered power dy-
namics within multi-lateral trade fora, especially in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). As an evidence, in 
the Doha Development Round’s (DDR) outcome, the 
effort paid by the EU to include in multilateral negotia-
tions such topics as competition and investments, has 
been promptly halted by developing countries’ oppo-
sition. In open contrast with the commitment to mul-
tilateralism promoted by former Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy (1999 – 2004), under the chairmanship of 
Commissioner Peter Mendelson, the EU put forward 
a new trade outlook, as illustrated by the Communi-
cation ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’. Some 
commentators suggested (Abbott, 2008; Kutlay, 2009) 
that the most striking element of novelty of this strat-
egy was by far the emphasis on bilateral and regional 
agreements. 
According to Woolcock (2007) three main aspects had 
determined the rationale behind EU’s renewed com-
mercial interest for FTAs. First, EU-FTAs could neutral-
ize trade diversion effects brought about by the FTAs 
set up among third countries; second, FTAs would be 
viable tools to establish deeper commercial relations 
with countries experiencing rapid economic growth; 
finally, FTAs could serve as a way to enforce interna-
tional trade rules. While explaining the EU’s attitute to-
wards FTAs, Woolcock affirms that ‘[the EU] is motivat-
ed by a desire to achieve in FTAs what it has failed to 
achieve in multilateral negotiations’ (2007: 4).1 Yet the 
author further specifies the causes for the EU’s change 
in trade strategy: in particular, the failure to include 
the ‘Singapore issues’ (investment, competition, trade 
facilitation, goverment procurement) or ‘deep trade 
agenda’ (Young and Peterson 2006) into the DDA;  the 
US renewed attitude towards the use of FTAs; the in-
creased competition over emerging Asian markets 
(see Sally 2007; Kutlay 2009). As an evidence, the US 
involvement in important new markets, i.e. South-Ko-
rea, through the mean of FTA fostered a ‘growing pres-
sure for EU exporters and investors in the region for 
the EU to strengthen its presence’ (Woolcock 2007: 5). 
The 2006 Communication put emphasis on one par-
ticular feature, namely the fact that ‘the current geog-
raphy of EU FTAs mainly covers our neighbourhood 
and development objectives well, but our main trade 
interests less well’ (EU Commission, 2006: 14). Conse-
quently, the document provided the new benchmarks 
to enhance EU trade policy:
t Maintaining WTO at the centre of the interna-
tional trading system to strengthen its multilateral-
based functioning, further liberalize world trade and 
achieve the DDA objectives;
t Widening the EU’s economic scope through 
an enhanced conceptualization of FTAs. Bilateral 
agreements must regain importance to boost the 
EU’s competitiveness and deepen EU trade relations 
with emerging markets (especially Asia’s markets);
t Taking into consideration partner’s market 
potential (economic size and growth) and level of 
protection against EU exports (existence of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers) when setting up new FTAs. 
Following these criteria particular countries (South 
Korea, India and Russia) and regional blocs (ASEAN, 
1 As regard to this point, alsoYoung and Peterson (2006) 
stress how the EU is actually trying to push forward the issues 
not enforceble through multilateral cooperation via alternative 
channels, such in fact FTAs
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Mercosur, GCC) emerge as priorities. 
t Widening the areas of liberalization including 
services, investment, public procurement and com-
petition. Investment promotion and facilitation ac-
quire special importance.2 
Bearing these elements in mind, it is shown that the 
institutional changes introduced by the ToL may be 
possibly considered as the consequential step taken 
in order to address EU trade policy’s weaknesses and 
boost EU’s trade actorness. Looking at the larger pic-
ture, the EU market power has steadily decreased 
as a consequence of the rise of the developing and 
dynamic ‘Rest’ – from 1996 to 2005 in fact EU’s world 
market share has slightly diminished both in value 
and volume terms, losing respectively -1.3 and -1.7 
percentage points in market share (Trade DG 2008: 
11). On the internal side, the EU has demonstrated 
to fall short of political will and suitable measures to 
become ‘the world most dynamic knowledge-based 
economy’, as envisaged by the 2000 Lisbon Strategy3 
(Wyplosz 2010). 
Hence, the gradual switchover to a FTAs-based regime 
might be ascribed to a series of interrelated dynam-
ics. On global scale, the world economy’s recasting 
led to the decrease of EU’s global economic actorness 
and to a more general reconsideration of costs and 
benefits deriving from the thorough acceptance of a 
multilateral trading system. At EU level, these changes 
implied the restoration of trade-related postures in 
open contrast with those previously pursued. The EU 
committed to the goal of re-asserting and preserving 
its role in the world economy by maximazing the ca-
pacity to expend its range of action, both geographi-
cally and in terms of trade-areas. As a matter of fact, 
‘this relative decline in EU market power is likely to be 
2 See Evenett (2007) for a detailed account of EU trade 
policy’s evolution since 1995 and Sally (2007) to grasp EU’s shift 
towards Asia’s markets.
3 The Lisbon Agenda stemmed from March 2000 Euro-
pean Council, where EU member states agreed on a platform 
of ambitious goals aiming at coping with new challenges faced 
by the EU economy, such as her ageing population (see Gros, 
2005). Growth and jobs are in fact the main points to be further 
developed and strengthened. Research and innovation become 
the foundamental factors driving the EU towards a knowledge-
based, investment-attractive and sustainable economy. The po-
litical and economic guidelines spelled out in the Lisbon Decla-
ration also fostered the introduction of a new set of instruments, 
the so-called ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) to ensure 
better level of flexibility and implementation (João Rodrigues, 
2005). 
a factor favouring the continued use of bilateral trade 
agreements in which the EU can make more use of 
any asymmetry in economic power relative to other 
countries’ (Woolcock, 2010a: 14).  
The EU’s Trade Policy
Before the enforcement of the ToL, the Article 133 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC) ascribed the EC institutions the exclusive com-
petence to deal with EC trade policy. However, as 
Woolcock points out (2005: 379), the Commission had 
often underlined that in the areas of services, invest-
ments and intellectual properties the EC powers had 
to be further extended. Following revision treaties 
did not substantially widen Commission’s powers in 
trade policy-making. Under Article 133 (TEC) the EU 
was entitled to negotiate multilateral agreements, 
whereas Article 310 regulated the EU’s role in bilateral 
and region-to-region agreement’s negotiations. There 
were some differences between the two policy pro-
cesses involved, but both attained to the ‘Community 
method’ procedures. 
When the EU negotiated trade agreements within a 
multilateral organization, such as WTO, the Commi-
sion elaborated a draft mandate expressing the EU’s 
position on a given topic, but also mirroring mem-
ber states’ and civil society’s claims, above all interest 
groups. This draft was discussed within a Commitee of 
senior trade officials set up by Article 133 to be finally 
approved by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) by a qualified majority vote (QMV); 
however practically by consensus. Hence the Com-
mission was the only actor allowed to represent and 
put forward EU’s interest in multilateral negotiations. 
The outcome of the negotiations would have been 
adopted by the GAERC, generally again via consensus-
building. The assent of the European Parliament (EP) 
was required only if the agreement implied modifica-
tions to the existing acquis. By contrast, in bilateral or 
region-to-region negotiations the EP’s role was strog-
er because it had to grant its simple majority vote’s 
assent over any agreements. Most importantly, the 
Council decided on the final adoption of the agree-
ment through the unanimity vote. 
The ToL brought about several novelties. Yet Woolcock 
(2010; 2010a) underlines three main changes. First of 
all, the ToL clarifies the attribution of competence 
between the EU and the member states; secondly, 
it enhances the role of the EP in the EU trade policy-
making and finally it includes external trade and in-
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vestment policy in the overall frame of the European 
External Action (EEA). 
The ToL has fulfilled the task of moving all trade-relat-
ed aspects for services, intellectual property (IP) and 
foreign direct investments (FDI) under the EC exclu-
sive competence. De Quevedo Ruìz (2009: 85) in fact 
points out (see also Woolcok 2010: 22) that under the 
provision of Article 133 (TEC) there was no clear at-
tribution of competence concerning services and 
IPs between the EU and member states. As a conse-
quence the competence in those matters was shared, 
and FTAs dealing with those items were ‘mixed’ as they 
also included member states’ national competences. 
Article 207 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU) replacing the Article 133 (1) (TEC) has indeed 
extended the definition of trade policy thus granting 
the EU the exclusive competence 
…with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods 
and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken 
in the event of dumping or subsidies. 
This provision further entails the GAERC to use the 
QMV even for agreements related to services and IP, 
eliminating the unanimity vote.4 The straighforward 
consequence is faster policy-making over a wider 
range of areas in order to develop a more effective 
and inclusive trade policy. Article 207 (1) of ToL also 
casts the EU’s exclusive competence over FDI. The Ar-
ticle’s provision offers an overall framework for invest-
ment liberalization and protection,5 even tough mem-
ber states’ autonomy to establish Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) with third parties will be substantially 
curtailed. As a matter of fact, EU-BITs will gradually 
replace individual EU member states’ BITs with third 
countries, on condition that the eventual ‘EU invest-
4 However, Article 207 (4) (a) (b) underlines that the 
unanimity vote would be used by the Council for agreements 
concerning trade in cultural, audiovisual, social, education and 
health services in order to preserve EU’s cultural diversity and 
welfare provisions. This shows that the principle of ‘parallelism’ 
introduced with the Treaty of Nice (ToN) has not been overruled.
5 As Woolcock points out (2010: 24), once that FDI have 
fallen under EU exclusive competence, BITs set up by member 
states before the entrance into vigour of ToL would provide a 
case for exemption (grandfathering clause) even violating the 
relevant provision.
ment model’ will provide better terms for investors 
than the ones offered by member states. 
The ToL further strengthen the role of EP in EU trade 
policy-making. Once the co-decision mechanism has 
been defined as an ordinary legislative procedure 
(OLP), the Council and the EP, especially through the 
International Trade Committee (INTA), share the pow-
ers to set up the EU’s commercial policy. In particu-
lar, since now on INTA will have to be reported by the 
Commission about the developments during nego-
tiations, altough it does not take part in the process 
as much as the Trade Policy Committee, that actu-
ally assists the Commission throughout negotiations. 
However the EP still lacks the power to shape the ob-
jectives and authorize negotiations, but its consent 
is required for all kind of trade arrangements before 
Council’s adoption of the agreement. 
Finally, the inclusion of trade policy in the framework 
of the EU’s external action is a crucial point to start 
wondering about what role the EU will grant to trade 
in the context of its foreign policy and more generally, 
external action. To this extent, the after-ToL trade pol-
icy is closely linked with the issue of the EU’s interna-
tional actorness. According to Woolcock (2010a: 3-7) 
EU trade actorness’ attributes are: market power, in 
terms of size and market access; EU’s recognition as an 
actor independent from EU member states, especially 
via European Commission’s role in negotiations; cohe-
sion among member states in order to shape an au-
tonomous EU position; normative power, stemming 
from shared norms and standards’ ability to influence 
other actors’ decisions. Furthermore, parliamentary 
accountability over trade policy, which before the ToL 
was the least developed aspect (see also Young and 
Peterson 2006).6  If one may accurately say that the ToL 
strengthen the role of both the European Commis-
sion and the EP, more should be argued as regards the 
EU’s trade actorness and the deriving way of exercis-
ing power. It has been widely acknowledged that the 
EU’s power in international relations is based on the 
capability to constraint others’ conducts through ‘soft’ 
means excluding coercitive or military  instruments. In 
his seminal article Ian Manners (2002) defined the EU’s 
power, and therefore the EU’s peculiar kind of interna-
tional actorness, in terms of establishing ‘what passes 
as normal in international relations’, which means, the 
ability to set the normative framework influencing ac-
6 However Hagemann (2008) casts some doubts about 
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tors’ behaviours. However, it might be misleading to 
adapt the persuasive character featuring the concept 
of ‘soft’ power (ye 1991) to the EU when it acts as a 
‘trade’ power (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005). Assuming 
that the changes set up by the ToL magnified the EU’s 
trade actorness, would not automatically imply the in-
crease in the EU’s power to shape the rule of the glob-
al trade-system. Rather, it might be argued that once 
defined the conditions for the EU to re-emerge as a 
leading trade actor, the mechanisms of conditionality 
entailed in the FTAs would acquire further relevance 
as the crucial element to address others’ behaviour in 
line with the EU’s expectations. Conditionality is in fact 
the tool that the EU uses to transform its economic 
power, into the leverage capable of shaping others’ 
actions, thus exercising its power ‘through’ the chan-
nel of trade. 
Such a consideration may be tested in the case of 
the EU’s CU with Turkey. The question of horizontal 
coherence across different EU external policy areas, 
i.e. trade and enlargement, it is in fact the key to 
understand what kind of effects the post-ToL EU’s 
trade policy is likely to produce vis-à-vis Turkey’s 
accession process. More specifically, how will the 
EU’s new trade strategy affect existing trade agree-
ments, such as the CU established with Turkey in 
1995?
The EU-Turkey Customs Union 
In 1963 the Association Agreement between the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, 
the so called ‘Ankara Treaty’, was signed envisaging 
three main points: the creation of a CU between the 
EEC and Turkey; free mobility of labour; and eventu-
ally Turkey’s ECC full membership (Article 28 of the 
Treaty). Those goals had to be achieved through a 
three-phase process consisting of a 5-year ‘prepara-
tory stage’ when the EEC provided Turkey with eco-
nomic assistance in order to smooth the passage 
to  the ‘transitional stage’ to finalize the Customs 
Union. In 1973 the ‘Additional Protocol’ modified 
the Ankara Treaty and outlined 1996 as the dead-
line to achieve the CU. The Additional Protocol en-
tailed a remarkable reduction of EC protectionist 
barriers for Turkish industrial goods (textile exclud-
ed). Likewise Turkey agreed on lowering tariffs and 
quotas on EEC exports (Öniş 2001). The ‘final phase’ 
would have established the CU; however, owing to 
the growing political instability and Turkey’s debt 
crisis, in 1977 Turkey freezed Additional Protocol’s 
provisions and unilaterally stopped customs lower-
ing.7  
The 1980 ‘January 24 Decision’ for economic stabiliza-
tion and liberalization had the objective to align Turk-
ish economy with the changing European economic 
environment. The economic reforms contained in the 
programme, which ushered Turkey into its first phase of 
economic liberalization (1980-1989), soon produced the 
desired outcomes. Macroeconomic adjustments were 
mainly oriented to promote exports and gradually liber-
alize imports, along with the deregulations of exchange 
rate and capital movements. Inflation lowered to 35-40% 
from the three-digit rate of the previous years, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average of 
5.8% without recession. During the same period, follow-
ing the liberalization of trade and financial markets, the 
export-GDP ratio trebled, shifting from 4.1% to 13.3%. 
However, in this phase foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flow was still unremarkable, thereby similarly to the Greek 
case we cannot speak of investment-led growth. After the 
abolishment of the ‘Law for the Protection of the Value 
of the Lira’ in 1984 foreign exchange regime and capital 
movements were also liberalized. As a result, along with 
the steady depreciation of Turkish Lira (TL) short-term 
money markets were established and the whole domes-
tic financial market vigorously stepped into the global 
financial system (Ertuğrul and Selcuk, 2001). During that 
period the role of the state as an economic actor, both in-
vestor and producer, was dramatically curtailed through 
an intense process of privatization affecting the so-called 
‘state economic enterprises’ (SEEs). However, wages were 
constantly eroded by this combination of privatization 
and restrictive policies. As Mütfüler (1995) shows, struc-
tural adjustments carried on throughout the 1980s had 
the goal to offset European economic integration’s ef-
fects over Turkish economy. Non-tariff barriers’ removal 
and Southern countries’ new membership further maxi-
mized EC market integration at the expense of Turkey’s 
welfare gains. Freer circulation of productive factors mag-
nified intra-EC trade, in particular thanks to the fact that 
the rest of the EC achieved free access to new EC-mem-
bers dynamic markets. Thus far Turkey’s external trade 
was dominated by the EC: imports and exports absolute 
volume steadily increased, however Turkey’s shares of im-
7 Turkey in fact faced a steep balance of payment’s wors-
ening due to the considerable foreign reserves’ outflows used to 
pay energy bills after the 1973-74 oil-shock. Stagflation further 
decreased EEC’s demand for Turkish manufactures, thus foster-
ing industrial recession. Ecevit’s expansionary monetary policy 
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ports from the EC started to boost since the second half 
of the 1980s, as a result of improved macro-economic 
conditions. Contrarely, Turkey’s share of exports to EC be-
tween 1985 and 1988 went sharply above and below the 
average of 45% respectively (see Table 1 and 2). It is then 
arguable that Common External Tariff’s (CET) imposition 
in the new members’ markets increased intra-EC trade at 
1995, one year after the establishment of the CU. The ef-
fect of trade liberalization and the growing productive 
specialization helped Turkish export-industry to con-
the expense of Turkish goods’ competitiveness in the Eu-
ropean markets. Nonetheless, Turkey’s competitiveness 
problem may also be explained looking at Turkey’s spe-
cialization in lower value-added goods, such as textile, 
iron and steel. However, on a longer time-frame, Turkey’s 
exports grew rapidly at an annual rate of 17.2%, while the 
export/GDP ratio shifted from 4,1% in 1980 to 12,8% in 
centrate on the manufacturing sector, which in fact 
began to cover a higher share of the overall exports 
(see Table 3). Between 1980-1990 the manufacturing 
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Source: Mütfüler, Meltem (1995), “Turkish Economy Liberalization and European Integration”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (19), January 1995, 85-98; p. 89. 
Source: Mütfüler, Meltem (1995), “Turkish Economy Liberalization and European Integration”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (19), January 1995, 85-98; p. 89. 
sector grew by 7.9% annually, while in the following 
decade its growth reached 5.9% (World Bank 2000).  
Through this process Turkey not only reduced its im-
port tariffs, mainly on EC goods, from 10% to 60% in 
six years (1988-1994) in order to align with CET, but 
it also experienced a economic growth, boosting Tur-
growth was 4.2% (World Bank 2000; OECD 2010). Fur-
ther reforms aimed at restructuring the bank-system 
and financial sector, for the TL’s exchange rate to be 
market-determined. In 1989 currency full-convertibil-
ity was also established. On the external dimension, 
financial reforms eased capital inflows and outflows, 
while on the internal side interest rates and credit-
issuing were totally liberalized. However, no adequate 
financial istitutions have been set up in order to su-
pervise the whole transition, consequently fuelling a 
dramatic increase of corruption  (Öniş 2004). 
To sum up, throughtout the 1980s Turkey actively 
shifted from an import-substitution to an export-
oriented economy, maintaining the EC as the main 
trade partner. However, it is not accurate to speak 
key’s GDP from $128 billion in 1980 to $322,1 billion in 
1990 and doubling the international trade share over 
the whole GDP. In terms of annual growth, during the 
same time-span Turkish GDP increased annualy by the 
average rate of 5.4%. The outcome was less satisfac-
tory in the following decade, when the average GDP 
of a proper ‘growth effect’ deriving from the ‘January 
24 Decision’. Despite stable GDP growth rate, capital 
accumulation was undermined by high volatility of 
financial markets and even higher levels of inflation. 
Restrictive monetary policies further curtailed rooms 
for human capital accumulation. Indeed, the Turkish 
case in 1980s-1990s has been defined as the classic 
example of ‘boom-bust’ economy (Ertuğrul and Selcuk 
2001): better investment conditions certainly favoured 
physical capital accumulation, thereby prompting 
medium-term growth effects; however less focus on 
human and knowledge capital undermined long-
term growth effects (see Baldwin & Wyplozs, 2009). 
The combination of these factors in Turkish economy 
meant cyclical current account inbalance leading to 
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Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), “Trade and 
Competitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 5. 
Source: IFM; adapted by the author. 
financial volatility, especially throughout the second 
phase of liberalization (1989-1995) (see tables 4 and 
5). The years before the establishment of the CU were 
marked by high level of inflation and external deficit 
(see figures 1). However, the decisive impulse to fos-
ter EC-Turkey integration came from politics. In 1989 
the EC rejected 1987 Turkey’s application for member-
ship. This event shifted Turkish policy-makers’ atten-
tion towards the creation of a customs union, which 
was not seen as a mere alternative but as a crucial 
step towards full-fledged membership. During the 
1990s party fragmentation led to the emergence of 
Necmettin Erbakan’s islamist Welfare Party (WP) at the 
expense of the more secular True Path Party’s (TPP) 
leadership. Hence, most prominent TPP figure Tansu 
Çiller used the rise of political Islam as a scapegoat to 
trigger the CU’s establishment. She in fact argued that 
the CU’s failure, broadly meaning the impossibility to 
join the EC, was likely to gradually transform Turkey 
into an Islamist regime, whereas a firm commitment 
from the EC would have preserved the country’s 
secular and Western-oriented tradition (Mütfüler-Bac 
1998). The Association Council Decision N. 1/95, bet-
ter known as ‘1995 Agreement’, implied for Turkey a 
‘substantial alignment of regulatory regimes’ (Ülgen 
and Zahariadis 2004). In particular the CU required: 1) 
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Sources: Eurostat; in Gros, D. (2005), “Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership”, CEPS Policy Brief, 69, 
April 2005, 1-10, p. 3. The author makes a comparison with Spain’s economy, which became an EU’s new member 
when Turkey lodged its application for full-membership, so as to demonstrate the different patterns of economic 
integration between EU members and non-members. 
Sources: Ertoğrul, A. & F. Selçuk (2001), “A Brief Account of Turkish Economy, 1980 – 
2000”, in Russian and East European Finance and Trade, pp. 1 – 27; p. 2. 
Sources: Ertoğrul, A. & F. Selçuk (2001), “A 
Brief Account of Turkish Economy, 1980 
– 2000”, in Russian and East European 
Finance and Trade, pp. 1 – 27; p. 8
bilateral removal of industrial tariffs, a process started 
with the Additional Protocol consisting of customs 
duties’ complete elimination; 2i) the harmonization of 
Turkey’s external industrial tariff with the CET on im-
ports from third countries (an average of 3%) under 
the provision of Article 16; 3) adoption of the acquis 
communautaire in the matter of TBT’s elimination, 
the EU and trade partners and implementing their 
provisions, including IPs. Thtough this the CU deep-
ened the extent of economic integration between the 
EU and Turkey both in terms of legislative harmoniza-
tion and trade volume.  The implementation of the CU 
certainly impacted Turkish economy, both in terms of 
foreign trade and EC-Turkey trade. On the import side, 
in the year of the inception of the CU, Turkey’s over-
all imports raised by 22,2%, but in terms of imports 
from the EC the increase was by 37,2%. However, 
these figures decreased sharply in the following years, 
mostly due to the 1998-99 financial turmoil caused by 
the crises in Russia and Southeast Asia. In the period 
of 1995–2002 the average share of imports coming 
from the EU was around 49,3%, but the pattern was 
highly uneven: in 2001 for instance Turkey’s imports 
from Europe accounted only for 44,2% of the total. On 
the export side, Turkey traded on average with the EU 
the 50,7% of its total exports, especially in 1998 and in 
the 2000s (see table 6). The establishment of the CU 
proved to be more beneficial for Turkey in terms of in-
creasing imports rather than exports, thus augment-
ing Turkey’s foreign debt deficit with the EU. However, 
under the CU regime the EU positively remained Tur-
key’s major trade partner. 
EU-Turkey external trade volume in the period 1999-
2008 experienced an almost steady increasing trend, 
protection of competition— in 1995 in fact Turkey de-
veloped its own competition laws on the EU model— 
administration of border procedures, rules of origins, 
protection of commercial, industrial and intellectual 
property rights; 4) under the provision of Article 54, 
the adoption of EU’s commercial policy towards third 
countries, which means accepting all FTAs between 
amounting to €93.463 million in the last year (Eurostat 
2010). In 1999 Turkey’s share of imports coming from 
the EU was 55.41%. However, interestingly enough in 
the period 2001-2010 EU’s share of Turkey’s total trade 
volume started to decline from 53,63% in 2003 to 
42,29% in 2010. This downturn cannot be explained 
only through the recent economic crisis because the 
declining share of trade towards EU countries began 
when Turkey’s imports and exports were still boom-
ing. On the other hand, Turkey has become the EU’s 
seventh biggest imports partner accounting for 3.0% 
of the EU’s total imports and the fifth major export 
partner receiving the 4.1% of the EU’s exports (Europe-
an Commission 2008). Is it then arguable that Turkey’s 
economy is highly integrated with the EU’s economy? 
Should this assumption be posed under review? The 
EU’s economy is surely more dependent on the US, 
China, Russia and EFTA members, especially Norway 
and Switzerland, than on Turkey. However, in the pe-
riod of 2001-2010 it is acknowledged that also Turkey 
started to gradually diversify its trade patterns: Middle 
Eastern and Asian countries have attracted the bulk of 
Turkey’s import-export shares showing a clearly rising 
trend. As a combined effect of the 2008 financial crisis 
and Turkey’s trade patterns diversification, total trade 
between Turkey and the EU dropped from $138,193 
million in 2008 to $37,605 million in 2010 (see Table 7). 
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Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), “Trade and Com-
petitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 6. 
Turkey’s trade diversification may be understood tak-
ing into account several factors. Regions of the Black 
Sea, the Caspian Sea and the whole Greater Middle East 
adquired more importance in global trade, and Turkey, 
due to its peculiar geographical position, may foster a 
pivotal role in the region. A clear sign of such an inten-
tion may be seen nowadays as regard to energy supply, 
where Turkey is acting to become the ‘energy-corridor’ 
bringing hydrocarbons directly to European markets 
(Tekin and Williams 2009; 2009a). Despite the fact that 
the EU is still the main commercial partner, Turkey’s cen-
trality within countries with abundant energy resourc-
es, dynamic economies and growing internal demands 
seems to set the basis for an on-going economic up-
grade. Turkey’s efforts to strengthen trade parternship 
and establish new cooperation agreements with its 
neighbourhood spells out a certain interest in becom-
ing a major hub in the region. In the meanwhile, trade 
patterns’ diversification would increase Turkey’s gains 
in terms of volume trade, specialization and export-led 
economic growth. In the light of what has been set up 
as the new Turkish foreign policy doctrine,8 becoming 
a regional hub for trade and energy would increase 
Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the EU, as the membership does 
not seem a sudden alternative. 
According to the official data in April 2010 in fact ex-
port to the Near and Middle East covered the 19,3% of 
Turkey’s total export, while the 8,2% has been traded 
with other Asian countries. The Organization of Black 
8 The concept of “Strategic Depth” created by the current 
Fpreign Minister Ahmnet Davutiglu is based on the assumption 
that Turkey must gain a primary role in world affairs (“centrality”) 
due to its historical legaly and geographical location. One of the 
means to realize this aim is in fact trade relations.
Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC) amounts to the 
13% of Turkey’s total exports. On the import side al-
most 30% of Turkey’s imports come from the Asian 
continent, almost 40% from OBSEC and former Sovier 
Republics, while almost 14,4% originates from Middle 
Eastern and South-East Asian countries grouped within 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Turkey’s 
Undersecretary of the prime Ministry for Foreign Trade 
2009). 
One of the key issue in the debate about the future 
sustanability of the CU agreement deals with agricul-
ture. Although the CU set up the basis for deeper in-
tegration towards Turkey’s full membership,  a crucial 
sector for Turkish economy such as agriculture has not 
yet been included in the arrangement. Despite the 
declining weight of agriculture in Turkish economy, 
in 2007 this sector still employed 26% of Turkish la-
bour force accounting for 9% of the GDP (see Table 8). 
Turkey’s eventual membership would widen the EU’s 
agricultural area of 39 million hectares. Turkey in fact 
is a major agricultural producer and net exporter: in 
2007 its cereal production equaled 11.4% of the EU’s 
production, fruit and vegetables equaled 60%. Given 
these data it is possible to understand the EU’s reluc-
tance to fully liberalize agriculture. Albeit Common 
Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) new logic has moved price 
floors to market-determined prices compensating 
farmers’ losses with direct payments, if Turkish agricul-
tural products were fully liberalized within the context 
of the CU, market prices would reach a lower equilib-
rium level and the EU’s reimbursements to farmers 
would sharply increase. However, it is worth noting 
that the bulk of agricultural trade between the EU and 
Turkey already abides with preferential trade rules and 
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it is mostly liberalized (Grethe 2003: 27), although no 
fixed timetable is scheduled to thoroughly include 
agriculture in the CU. In case of its full inclusion in 
the CU framework, Turkey would be constrained 
to lower its prices in accordance with the WTO-led 
trend pushing towards the liberalization of agricul-
tural goods. This in turn would affect negatively the 
welfare gains of Turkish farmers, already in a disad-
vantaged position because mostly concentrated 
in the poorest areas. Lowering of the agricultural 
prices would increase the need to support produc-
ers through export subsidies, administered prices 
and direct payments. The ongoing liberalization of 
agricultural good in fact has already affected Tur-
key in this sense. In 1998 only producer support in 
Turkey cost € 9 million, while in 2000 the 86% was 
granted as price support, creating sharp distortion 
effects (Grethe 2003: 29). 
Thus far, Turkey has benefited from the CU as long 
as this arrangement provided the framework to 
gradually shape Turkey’s trade legislation on the 
acquis bases. Legislative harmonization, alignment 
with CET and adoption of FTAs set up by the EU 
clearly increased Turkey’s access to third countries’ 
markets. Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) ar-
gue that acting simoultaneously on the ‘internal’ 
sphere, i.e. the CU, and the ‘external’ dimension, i.e. 
tariff reduction with third countries, would reduce 
‘trade diversion’ effects. As a matter of fact Ülgen 
and Zahariadis (2004: 21) state that ‘stronger bilat-
eral trade has thus been accompanied by stronger 
trade growth overall [for Turkey]’ . Indeed Harri-
son, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) calculated Turkey’s 
gains from bilateral liberalization as recurring and 
accounting for 1-1.5% of the GDP. However they 
outlined revenue replacement as a big challenge. 
Since Turkey would be likely to lose around 1.4% of 
the GDP from tariffs reduction, fiscal deficit should 
not be increased in order to offset the loss. Reduc-
ing export subsidies applied to trade with third 
countries is an important measure in order to both 
diminuish distortion effects and alleviate the bur-
den on fiscal deficit. In addittion Zahariadis (2004 
in Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004) estimates that har-
monization with EU technical regulations and abo-
lition of technical barriers would account for 1.5% 
of the GDP. 
As substantial tariff reduction implies an imports 
increase, currency depreciation is needed to boost 
exports and keep the current account in balance. 
In the Turkish case acting on the exchange rate has 
often spiralled inflation. However, given the exclu-
sion of agriculture from the CU arrangement and 
Turkey’s maintainance of relatively higher tariff, the 
agricultural sector ended up being a more protect-
ed sector. This led in turn to increase the assymetry 
of the integration depth within the CU, with nega-
tive effects for Turkey. As a matter of fact, in order to 
balance different exports level between the indus-
trial and the agricultural sectors Turkey would have 
to subsidize agricultural goods boosting exports 
in an inefficient way and negatively affecting fiscal 
deficit. Therefore the asymmetric nature of the CU 
posed some problems that should be addressed 
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Source: State Planning Organization (SPO), IFM. In Utkulu, U. and Seymen, D. (2003), 
“Trade and Competitiveness Between Turkey and the EU: Time Serie Evidence”, 1 – 28, p. 6. 
* Usable agricultural area (UAA); *** 2006 data.
fostering widening and deepening measures. 
In addittion, the CU has also produced several 
drawbacks. To start with,  the CU’s main weakness 
seems to be the lack of cooperation and consulta-
tion between the two parties in dealing with com-
mercial policy’s choices, since Turkey has actually 
no say on EU external trade policy. This in turn has 
led to inconsistency between the EU and Turkey 
trade policy. After 1996 and especially following 
the 2006 EU’ change in trade policy strategy, Ülgen 
and Zahariadis (2004: 26) stress that
The EU went ahead and concluded these agreements 
[FTAs with third countries] without actually taking 
into consideration the existence of a custom union 
arrangement with Turkey. As such, there were no prior 
consultations with Turkey and therefore Turkish con-
cerns did not come into play during the negotiations. 
Yet, because of the custom union arrangement, Tur-
key was forced to conclude a similar agreement with 
those countries after the EU did. 
This phenomenon is seen as the origin of a high-
ly detrimental situation for Turkey. The EU’s trade 
partners have proved very often to be unwilling to 
negotiate with Turkey because via FTA’s establish-
ment with the EU and in virtue of EU-Turkey CU, 
they were able to export tariff-free goods also to 
the Turkish markets. By contrast, since the prefer-
ential agreement just included goods originating 
from the EU, they were not bound to lower their 
tariffs vis-à-vis Turkish goods. To this extent, EU-
Turkey CU created a typical case of ‘trade deflec-
tion’. Implications for Turkey were, firstly the fact 
that Turkish exporters found themselves in disad-
vantage as regards the EU’s exporters towards third 
countries as Turkish goods did not fall within the 
preferential agreement; secondly the loss of poten-
tial tariff revenues from goods coming from third 
countries who entered the Turkish market via EU 
(Kutlay 2009: 127). 
The second drawback is that several areas are still 
not included in the CU. Besides the ‘in-between’ 
case of agriculture, liberalization of trade in ser-
vices could have a strong impact on productivity 
and competitiveness of Turkey’s service sector and 
furthermore, it would curtail state involvement in 
economic activities, ensure regulatory policy con-
vergence and improve economic governance. In 
addition, since Turkish economy is rapidly shifting 
towards a service-led economy— service’s share 
of total GVA raised from 53.4% in 1998 to 64.4% in 
2008 (Eurostat 2010)— the liberalization of this sec-
tor could further improve CU parties’ mutual gains 
in terms of efficiency and lower prices. However EU 
members’ fear for ‘social dumping’, yet magnified 
by the latest enlargement, is likely to deny Turkish 
enterprises the right to settle and eventually bring 
their labour force to the EU. 
On Turkish side, the ‘implementation problem’, 
namely the insufficient and inadequate applica-
tion of norms and standards, also concerns techni-
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cal regulations, with the result that some indus-
trial goods categories heavily imported by the 
EU such as cars, chemicals and foodstuff, still do 
not fit with the standards. Trade flows then be-
come slower, with obvious welfare losses (Bary-
sch, 2005). Moreover, increasing current-account 
deficit, huge public debt and lower employment 
rate undermine Turkey’s ability to attract FDI, es-
pecially long-term inflows (see Table 9).
to widen the CU also liberalizing the service sec-
tor, the EP would be asked to grant its assent and 
via INTA it will be constantly updated about nego-
tiations’ outcomes. However, it would not be able 
to determine Commission’s choice of whether or 
not to widen the CU, but it will share the decision-
making power with the Council to eventually 
adopt the act. 
By contrast, the division of competence between 
EU and member states would have major reper-
cussions. Since new crucial areas have been in-
cluded under the umbrella of the EU;s exclusive 
competence, member states have agreed on 
yielding part of their trade policy’s autonomy to 
the Commission, thus enormously widening its 
power of initiative. Trade-related aspects of servic-
es, FDI and IPs are in fact the furthest challenges to 
international trade liberalization, given their grow-
ing weight 
The CU and the ToL
In order to understand what kind of implication 
the ToL could have on the EU-Turkey CU two fac-
tors should be taken into account. First, the likely 
institutional changes of the ToL affecting the EU 
trade policy and consequently the existing CU. 
Second, ToL novelties, interacting with global 
trade dynamics that may re-shape EU trade actor-
ness. With the ToL the EU has achieved institution-
al channels which widen and strengthen EU trade 
policy’s scope of action. Despite its importance 
insofar as EU legitimacy is concerned, it might be 
said that the increased role of the EP is not likely to 
determine EU-Turkey CU economic improvements 
or worsening. Rather, as the EP mirrors European 
society’s claims it would work as catalyst or obsta-
cle when time to deepen the EU’s relations with 
Turkey will be ripen. For instance, if the EU decided 
on national GDPs, the global shift towards tech-
nology and knowledge-based economy and their 
technical and legislative complexity. EU members 
decided to maximize their individual strength in 
bilateral as well as in multilateral negotiations  act-
ing collectively within the EU bloc. The obvious re-
sult might be two-fold: the Commission’s compe-
tence in trade policy has been extended in order 
to pursue a more coherent, encompassing and far-
reaching trade policy, and this may strengthen the 
EU in multilateral and bilateral negotiations; as a 
result, the overall EU’s capability to act as an inde-
pendent and assertive actor in international trade 
may be enhanced. Being empowered with the 
competence to include all the aspects concerning 
trade and trade liberalization in the globalization 
era, the EU would be able to exploit the compara-
tive advantage created by high added value and 
technological goods, knowledge, information and 
IT economies, highly developed human capital 
formation and accumulation. 
A possible scenario might occurr if and when the 
EU would apply the ToL’s provision related to trade 
policy within the context of the CU with Turkey. 
In this case the existing arrangement would be 
widened and deepened to a new dimension of 
trade integration between Turkey and the EU. In 
spite of macroeconomic constraints and struc-
tural asymmetries, such as agricultural sector’s rel-
evance, state-dominated enterprises and low lev-
el of competition enforcement, Turkish economy 
has proved to be dynamic and onward-oriented. 
Service, especially communication and transport, 
is a fast developing sector which is expected to 
become Turkish economy’s engine. As shown 
above, service liberalization between the EU and 
Turkey could push down prices as a result of the 
increased competition, thus augmenting net con-
sumers welfare gains and maximizing efficiency 
for producers. In the case of a more integrated CU, 
Turkish market will benefits not only in quantita-
tive terms, but also to the extent of stability and 
reliability. Hence, foreign agents would be more 
prone to invest in Turkey thus increasing long-
term FDI inflows. Under Article 207 (1) the EU will 
liberalize FDI while protecting EU investors, thus 
creating a mutually beneficial framework to en-
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sure a safe investment-environment and boost 
economy. Turkey, who still attracts a relatively low 
portion of FDI given its market size, will be directly 
favoured by this provision. To sum up, if applied 
to the existing arrangement the novelties brought 
about by the ToL could start up the CU on new, 
more dynamic and more challanging basis. 
However, the most thought-provoking point 
might depend on the EU future trends in trade 
policy. Once acknowledged that ToL reforms’ goal 
is to grant to the EU the capability to act as a more 
visible, coherent and effective trade actor, what 
is important to understand is how and in which 
direction the EU will carry on its trade policy. To 
this extent, it is still unclear whether the dynam-
ics taking place at global level, i.e. economic re-
gionalization vs. multilateralism, are likely to have 
a stronger impact than internal preferences, i.e. 
switchover to bilateral FTA/PTA-based regimes. 
Some authors (Abbott 2008; Kutlay 2009; Martin 
et al 2010), without putting into question the lib-
eralization trend undergone by global trade, have 
argued that multilateral liberalization has expe-
rienced a sharp decline favouring the flourish-
ing of FTAs. As it was shown above, also the EU 
since 2006 has underpinned its trade strategy to 
this logic bypassing the multilateral praxis. This 
shift is likely to hold for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, the crisis in Greece has prompted an 
escalation of panic throughout the EU and global 
markets (Nye, 2010), laying bare Economic Mon-
etary Union (EMU) structural asymmetries and 
Euroland’s currency vulnerability (Ito 2010; Rodrik 
2010). The EU has to find a way to reaffirm itself 
in the international trade arena,9 not only to sus-
tain welfare gains achieved so far but also to re-
state its primary legitimacy source, i.e. economic 
strength.  On the other hand, the EU is still one 
of the most important global economic actors, 
and the size and specialization of its economy can 
produce better trade-offs when it acts on bilateral 
or regional basis. In sum, it seems that the EU has 
9 For instance, Lady Catherine Ashton’s appointment 
as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who was in fact former EU Trade Commissioner 
is highly indicative of EU’s eagerness to point out trade as EU 
external action’s cornerstone.
started to grant much more value to the net gains 
achievable through FTAs rather than the ones pro-
vided by multilateral arrangements, mainly within 
the WTO rounds, regardless distortion effects em-
anating from the discriminatory character of each 
preferential agreements. 
Should the EU  keep pursuing its trade liberaliza-
tion agenda, now including also services, IPs and 
FDI, by favouring bilateral arrangements, Turkey’s 
gains from the current CU would be unequally dis-
tributed. Assuming that the EU carries on nego-
tiations in order to liberalize trade in services, FDI 
and IPs within the context of the CU, when the EU 
would set up the FTAs with third countries dealing 
with the same contents, the ‘trade deflection’ sce-
nario valid for industrial goods woud appear again 
in Turkey’s detriment. Furthermore, if the EU would 
decide not to extend service, IPs and FDI liberaliza-
tion to the CU with Turkey, distortion effects aris-
ing from preferential agreements between a world 
major trade bloc and highly dynamic economies 
on fast growing and gainful sectors would be 
likely to undermine Turkey’s global competitive-
ness and reduce its capability to penetrate new 
markets.10 Moreover, the practice of ‘shadowing’ 
the EU;s FTAs policy, being the only viable solu-
tion to offset the diversion and deflection effects, 
has proved to be costly. First, the bureacratic cost 
of initiating and maintaining separate negotia-
tion in order to settle a final agreement. Second, 
often the lack of willingness of the third party to 
negotiate with Turkey a FTA mirroring that estab-
lished with the EU. Needless to say, the outcome 
of this long-lasting and resource-draining process, 
is by no means secure. The inclusion of the ‘Turk-
ish clause’, requiring the third party to sign a simi-
lar FTA with Turkey, is an appropriate step to share 
this burden. Also, the fact that Turkey is compelled 
to undertake further efforts in order to counter-
balance the effects of the unilaterally decided EU 
trade policy, from the Turkish standpoint, is the 
result of the highly asimmetrical nature of the CU. 
10 However, as Kirişci (2009) points out, Turkey has started 
to pursue a more active ‘trade diplomacy’ in order to follow EU 
external trade policy and too sign bilateral preferential agree-
ments with EU’s new trade partners (see also Kutlay, 2009). This 
practice of ‘shadowing EU’s FTA policy’ has been for long carried 
on by EFTA (Baldwin & Wyplozs, 2009: 461).
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Status  of  Preferential  Trade  Agreements  (PTAs)  of  EU  and  Turkey  in  Comparative  Perspective
EU Turkey
Country Starting  Date  of  Negotiation
Signature  Date  of  the  
Agreement
Starting  Date  of  
Negotiation
Signature  Date  of  the  
Agreement
Isreal 1995 1995 1994 1996
EFTA
Countries 1990 1992 1990 1991
Croatia 2000 2001 2000 2002
Bosnia-­Herzegovina 2000 2007  (initialized) 2002 2002
Serbia 2005 2007 2007 continuing
Montenegro 1996 2006 2007 continuing
Morocco 1995 1995 1999 2004
Tunisia 1995 1995 2002 2004
Palestine 1995 1997 1999 2004
Syria 1995 2004(initialized) 2004 2004
Egypt 1995 2001 1998 2005
Albania 2000 2006 2003 2006
Jordan 1995 1997 2005 continuing
Lebanon 1995 2002 2003 continuing
South  Africa  Republic 1995 1999 2004(exploratory  talks) continuing
Algeria 1995 2001 Not  started March  2010  JEC*
Faeroe  Islands -­ 1991 2000 continuing
ACP  countries 1998 2000 Not  started -­
Mexico 1996 2000 Not  started -­
Mercosur April  2000 continuing June  2008(exploratory  talks)
-­
GCC 1990 continuing November  2005 continuing
Ukraine April  2008 continuing June  2007(exploratory  talks) -­
India June  2007 continuing February  2008(attempt) -­
Chile 2000 2002 March  2008 July  2009
South  Korea May  2007 October  2009 January  2008(attempt) -­
ASEAN May  2007 continuing June  2007(attempt) -­
Central  America September  2007(exploratory  talks)
April  2008
(I  round) Not  started -­
Andean  Community September  2007
(exploratory  talks)
April  2008
(I  round) Not  started -­
Pakistan -­ -­ November  2009 March  2010  MoUs**
Iran 2002 stalled 2007 April  2009
Table 10
Source: Kutlay, M. (2009), “The Changing Policy of the European Union towards Free Trade Agreements and its Effects on Turkish 
Foreign Trade: A Political Economy Perspective”, USAK Yearbook, 2, 117-132, p. 127.
* Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ** Memoranda of Understanding on economic cooperation, agriculture and investments
Conclusion
From the EU’s perspective, the institutional channels 
opened by the ToL are likely to strengthen the Com-
mission’s ability to cast a more coherent and inclusive 
trade policy, which in turn might be able to shape a 
more assertive and credible role as an autonomous 
actor in the international trade arena. Given current 
patterns of trade globalization, the high volatile nature 
of the international financial system and the growing 
intra-systemic asymmetry, multilateral arrangements 
seem harder to achieve and less attractive in terms of 
the immediate gains and positive outcomes. Thus, it 
is arguable that the FTAs will continue to be the most 
used trade arrangements insofar as trade liberaliza-
tion on wider and wider sectors is concerned. 
In this context, the EU-Turkey CU looks more like a li-
ability, rather than an assett. Comparing economic 
advantages that the EU would achieve under ToL pro-
vision as regards trade policy, and by contrast the det-
rimental situation that Turkey may face, it seems obvi-
ous that the ‘in-between’ solution offered via CU is not 
satisfying. Turkey is by far a rising international actor 
whose power is less and less based on its traditional 
military strength; economic relations and commercial 
ties have spread throughout its entire neighbouring 
area. The geography of Turkey’s economic actorness 
is radically changing: at the time of CU establishment 
Turkey was in fact exclusively dependent on the trade 
flows with the EC, while nowadays trade patterns have 
widened and diversified to great extent. A highly inter-
esting point is that Turkey’s share of market oriented 
to countries having just a marginal impact on the EU’s 
economy, such as Iran or Central Asian countries if we 
exclude natural resources, is dramatically growing. In 
this context, Turkey’s ability to act as a fully autono-
mous economic actor is curtailed by the CU’s bind-
ing provisions, which compell Turkey’s trade policy to 
attain to EU’s unilateral decisions. In this framework, 
Turkey’s wider interests run the risk to be subdued to 
a far rigid scheme. 
Furthermore, if we carefully look at the very reason ex-
plaining the establishment of a CU with the EU, name-
ly the prospect of full-fledged membership in the me-
dium-term, and even more carefully we read between 
the lines of EU political debate about Turkey’s acces-
sion, it is arguable that the mismatch among Turkey’s 
expectations, the commitment towards membership 
and the EU’s ambiguous behaviour is clearly deepen-
ing. More academic and public debate is needed in 
order to outline the changing nature of Turkey’s trade 
diversification and to evaluate the impact of keeping 
the CU up. Current arrangement appears too rigid and 
too less inclusive to match with Turkey’s economic 
dynamism. And without any serious evidence of an 
eventual membership, the CU long-term sustainabil-
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Introduction
Until the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European Union 
(EU) justified its legitimacy by mere ‘permissive con-
sensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41-42; Obra-
dovic 1996: 192). As long as the European polity did 
not influence people’s lives radically, they were will-
ing to give their consent to European integration as 
an elite affair (Obradovic 1996: 192). Since the Maas-
tricht Treaty, however, the policy competences of 
the EU have increased enormously, making the EU a 
polity which affects citizens’ lives directly on most of 
the societal matters (De Burca 1996: 350; Eriksen and 
Fossum 2000b: 264; Obradovic 1996: 192). Failed ref-
erenda, low degree of trust in European institutions, 
decreasing turnout in European elections, increasing 
number of protests, complaints about the missing so-
cial dimension of Europe, and the changing percep-
tions about the EU’s formal legitimacy (the insufficient 
accountability of the Commission, the insufficient leg-
islative powers of the Parliament in comparison to the 
Council of Ministers, the transparency deficit in the 
Council of Ministers etc.) have showed the academ-
ics that the days of ‘permissive consensus’ is over and 
that there is a problem with the legitimacy of the EU 
(Obradovic 1996: 192-193; Ehin 2008: 621; Eriksen and 
Fossum 2000b: 262; De Burca 1996: 350-352; Banchoff 
and Smith 1999a: 1; Dobson and Weale 2003: 162-165; 
Wimmel 2009: 182; Höreth 1999: 253-257; De Jonghe 
and Bursens 2003: 3-5). 
Nevertheless, not everyone accepts that the EU is in 
legitimacy ‘crisis’ (Moravcsik 1993, 2002; Majone 1998). 
Confusion on the topic is caused by the conflicting 
views on how to assess the legitimacy of the EU. Shall 
the same legitimation criteria be used for the EU that 
is used for international organizations? Would it suffice 
to use regulatory legitimacy criteria? Shall the same 
legitimation criteria that is used for liberal-democratic 
states be used for the EU? The valid way of assessing 
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The Lisbon Treaty could not meet the demands of many as regards the issue of the EU’s legitimacy and democratic 
governance. By analyzing the  literature on the legitimacy of the EU, the article shows why the EU has to fulfill the 
legitimacy criteria of the liberal-democratic states by defining the EU as a multi-level governance polity which affects 
the legitimacy of the member-states. This view discards the arguments for assessing the legitimacy of the EU as of an 
international organization. Likewise, it rejects the views arguing that the EU is a regulatory state and its legitimacy 
should be assessed in terms of regulatory legitimacy. A conceptual framework is provided at the end of this article to 
initiate an empirical research design to measure and subsequently perhaps to increase the legitimacy of the EU.
the legitimacy of the EU needs to be found before 
accepting the legitimacy ‘crisis’ argument. This article 
aims to provide a tentative solutuon to this puzzle by 
looking at the strength of arguments of different au-
thors after analysing the EU as a multi-level govern-
ance polity.
Multi-level Governance
 The concept of multi-level governance came to life 
when Gary Marks (1992) used EU-polity as an in-
dependent variable for examining structural policy 
(Bache and Flinders 2004: 2). The basic argument 
is that policy-making in the EU is not a centralized 
process in Brussels but involves European, national, 
regional, and local levels. Decision-making does not 
depend on a hierarchical model; decisions are taken 
after negotiations between these levels. The interac-
tion between these levels enables the governors to 
decide who is to take the lead in formulating and im-
plementing a particular policy or if the policy process 
should involve various actors cooperating to come up 
with effective results (Enderlein 2010:3-4; Bache and 
Flinders 2004: 3; Pierre and Peters 2005: 72; Delmar-
tino and Pattyn 2007: 187). Strong structure and strict 
rules are missing in this model, as decision-making 
process is vague and depends on negotiations (Rho-
des, 1996:652; Pierre and Peters 2005: 72; Dobson and 
Weale 2003:156). 
Multi-level governance can be defined by concentrat-
ing on four different aspects. Firstly, it is a model of 
governance; the model is inclusive of various private 
and public actors (Enderlein, 2010:2; Piattoni 2010:20 
and 250). Secondly, different levels of government 
including European, national, regional and local lev-
els are included in governance in a non-hierarchical 
way; actions of one specific level can be largely inde-
pendent from another level. Division of labour exists 
between public institutions at different levels (Pierre 
and Peters 2005: 83-84). Thirdly, rather than practis-
ing under strict legal frameworks, the non-hierarchical 
model based on flexible legal frameworks functions 
through negotiations between the actors who take 
place in governance process.  Thus, transnational 
multi-level governance resembles domestic networks 
(Enderlein, 2010:3; Pierre and Peters 2005: 86). Final-
ly, multi-level governance is a political game where 
highly autonomous actors compete to influence 
policy. Participating in the game may lead to influenc-
ing policy since there is no rigid structure. Players may 
change depending on policy and strong actors may 
moderate their demands in order to maintain their 
strong positions. The focus is more on efficiency and 
outcomes rather than procedures, and structures do 
not automatically decide the outcomes (Pierre and 
Peters 2005: 86-87 and 90).
Nature of the beast
What is the nature of the EU? Does the EU fit the multi-
level governance paradigm? Or does the EU resemble 
to other types of polities or international institutions? 
Intergovernmentalists for instance, have sought to 
describe the EU by concentrating on sovereignty, de-
cision-making authority of the national governments 
and the mere agent role of the supranational institu-
tions. Even though these agents might influence the 
decision-making process by dealing with details of 
policies, the ultimate decision-makers are states. Ju-
diciary and bureaucracy of the EU are not independ-
ent of the states. They have been created to ease the 
common decision-making and implementation pro-
cess (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 283-284; Marks et al. 
1996:342). 
According to the intergovernmental theorists, una-
nimity ensures that the sensitive issues cannot be 
forced upon any of the member-states and all policy 
arises out of bargaining and negotiations, ending 
up in lowest common denominator form (Moravcsik 
1993: 517). Liberal intergovernmentalist theory formu-
lated by Moravcsik, does not ignore the influence of 
various interest groups in shaping states’ position at 
the domestic level; this was a neglected phenomenon 
in the first intergovernmentalist accounts (Hoffman 
1966). However, Moravcsik shares a similar opinion 
with early intergovernmentalists, arguing that ‘supra-
national institutions’ cannot impose their interests on 
states which are rational actors (Moravscik 1993: 481-
482 and 519).
There are numerous alternative theories to intergov-
ernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism: ne-
ofunctionalism (Haas 1958), rational choice-theory, 
sociological institutionalism, historical institutional-
ism and constructivism have all sought to explain 
the causes and direction of European integration as 
a process (Pollack 2005: 26). The goal in this paper 
however, is to find a successful approach to European 
Union as an entity, so that different ways of assessing 
the legitimacy of this entity can be discussed. Scholars 
who have attempted to explain the EU from a com-
parative politics perspective have compared the EU 
to federal and confederal systems and advanced our 
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understanding of the EU as a polity (Pollack 2005: 26). 
Governance approach to the EU uses both interna-
tional relations and comparative politics to explain the 
EU as a sui generis polity which is neither a traditional 
international organization nor a Westphalian type do-
mestic state (Auberger and Iszkowski 2007: 272; Pol-
lack 2005: 36). 
According to Marks’s definition, ‘governance’ dimen-
sion of multi-level governance paradigm refers to in-
terdependence between governments and non-gov-
ernmental actors at different territorial levels (Marks 
1993: 402-403). Private actors and informal mecha-
nisms of governing are two unquestionable character-
istics of this model. Pierre and Peters argue that none 
of the European states that we know gives us a better 
example of this as the EU (Pierre and Peters 2009: 94). 
After the creation of the single market, domestic ac-
tors have moved their locus of attention from the do-
mestic level to the European level (Hooghe and Marks 
2003: 291-292). Interest groups try to influence deci-
sion-making by lobbying the Parliament, the Council 
of Ministers, and the Commission. European Com-
mission asks for their opinion and values their input 
(Schmidt 2004: 983), (Banchoff and Smith 1999a: 14) 
and (Banchoff and Smith 1999b: 212).  
Together with traditional legislation-making that is 
common in liberal-democratic states, the EU govern-
ance uses various soft modes of governance (Borrás 
and Conzelmann 2007: 531) and (Eberlein and Grande 
2005: 100). An example of such soft modes of govern-
ance is networks coordinated informally and based 
on soft harmonization (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 2; 
Jachtenfuchs 2003; Peterson 1995). These networks 
may involve representatives of nation-states, sub-na-
tional actors, experts, economic actors, and civil soci-
ety. Networks develop benchmarks or ‘best-practice’ 
rules and practices for governance – eg. European 
Forum for Electricity Regulation, Open Network Provi-
sion Committee etc. (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 100). 
Unlike the conventional hierarchical model, Open 
Method Coordination (OMC) mechanism allows the 
member-states to form their own goals and bench-
marks for pursuing European policies. (Pierre and Pe-
ters 2009: 94). OMC mechanism also allows the eco-
nomic and social actors to take part in policy-making 
and implementing (Holzhacker 2007: 266). The crea-
tion and usage of networks,that include various non-
governmental actors have been encouraged by the 
Commission (Banchoff and Smith 1999a: 12-13; Wal-
lace 2005: 495). 
The multi-level dimension of the multi-level govern-
ance paradigm suggests that there are different actors 
operating at different levels, creating governance in 
the EU by interaction. Central hierarchy is lacking in 
this model and a considerable interdependence ex-
ists between the levels. Involving sub-national groups 
have been encouraged by the Commission. A good 
example to this is the cohesion policy where Commis-
sion establishes partnerships with the sub-national 
level: the former bypasses the states and includes the 
subnational level into the political multi-level govern-
ance game. This allows the sub-national level to have 
the competence to jointly design, finance, and im-
plement economic development programs (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003: 297-298; Pierre and Peters 2005: 88). 
Moreover, multi-level governance has the political 
consequence of creating regional entities.
Policy-initiation in the EU is an empirical evidence of 
the non-hierarchical, multi-actor, negotiation-based 
multi-level governance in action. Although the Euro-
pean Commission is set to be the main actor, policy 
initiation includes interaction between the Commis-
sion, the Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Eu-
ropean Council, and interest groups including sub-
national ones (Marks et al 1996: 357-358; Hooghe and 
Marks 2003: 298). The policy implementation proceeds 
similarly; although the directives coming from Brus-
sels should be complied with, policy implementation 
is neither a strict hierarchical nor one level process. 
The commission shares authority with the member-
states by cooperating with the national committees 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003: 306; Pierre and Peters 2009: 
96). These committees involve representatives from 
both public and private sectors, and public sector 
may involve representatives from national authorities 
as well as sub-national ones (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 
306-307).
 All of these phenomena together may suggest 
that the states are not the sole deciders, and policy-
making involves both public and private groups, and 
different levels— subnational, national and suprana-
tional— without a traditional hierarchy1 (Hooghe and 
Marks 2003: 282; Delmartino and Pattyn 2007: 185). 
However, such a claim is not valid if those who take a 
multi-level governance approach towards the EU can-
1 One may add the transnational level to this. The latter 
has been ignored by many MLG scholars (George, 2004:124-125) 
and (Delmartino and Pattyn, 2007:185-186). An extensive argu-
ment about this issue is not the purpose of this paper.
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not disprove the intergovernmental interpretation of 
the European institutions, whose role reduces to be-
ing mere agents of the member-states. Analyzing the 
institutions of the EU can shed light on this puzzle.
The European Commission takes decisions by majority 
rule. Twenty seven Commissioners, who are proposed 
by each nation-state and are approved by the Presi-
dent of the Commission, are expected to act in favor of 
the EU as a whole rather than defending national inter-
ests (Eriksen and Fossum 2000a: 6). Commission’s posi-
tion, which makes it suitable for acquiring information 
from national and sub-national institutions, and inter-
est groups, makes it a highly competent informational 
base that can independently influence policy-making 
(Marks et al., 1996: 355; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 294). 
Although the process can be influenced by national 
and social actors, the European Commission, which 
is a supranational institution at the EU’s level, has the 
right to initiate legislation (Nugent 2006: 167-169; 
Hooghe and Marks 2003: 295; Pierre and Peters 2009: 
95-96).  It also has the agenda-setter and broker role 
under cooperation and co-decision procedures (Nu-
gent 2006: 187; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 302). Despite 
member states’ involvement due to Commission’s lack 
of capacity to implement policy, the latter also has the 
right to implementation and ensures that the direc-
tives are implemented according to the decisions that 
are taken in Brussels (Nugent 2006: 175; Pierre and Pe-
ters 2009: 95-96). This right also implies interpretation, 
issuing administrative regulations and decisions for 
specific cases (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 306).
Comitology can be a misleading concept for some 
since they might think that nation-states have gained 
control over the implementation process. Comitology 
is the weakest in areas where the Commission has 
strong executive powers (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 
306; Marks et al., 1996:367). Moreover, national gov-
ernments mainly select as members of the commit-
tees individuals among epistemic and business com-
munities, academics, sub-national officials (mainly in 
federal systems) and interest groups (Hooghe and 
Marks 2003: 306-307; Marks et al., 1996: 367-368).
The Commission negotiates on trade and environ-
ment issues and plays a crucial role in international 
negotiations (Nugent 2006: 186-187; Hooghe and 
Marks 2003: 295). The Commission also negotiates 
with countries applying to the EU and with countries 
seeking economic or cultural partnership with the 
EU (Nugent 2006: 186; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 296). 
Moreover, the vague nature of the treaties has ena-
bled the Commission to strengthen its role and legiti-
mize its preferences by referring to treaties. This was 
the case with the structural policy where the Commis-
sion has played the most important role in transform-
ing the regional policy into an interventionist policy 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003: 293). 
European Parliament is another example of a suprana-
tional institution in the European Union. Since 1979, 
the members of the Parliament are elected by the EU 
citizens. Party membership and ideology of the MEPs 
are often more important to the latter’s stance than 
nationality (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 291). Unlike 
Moravcsik, Hooghe and Marks argue that strengthen-
ing of the Parliament’s position has ended with the 
Council of Ministers losing its ultimate power in deci-
sion-making process (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 290). 
Apart from its power to request the Commission for 
policy and legislative initiation, influencing budgetary 
matters and control and supervision of the executive, 
the European Parliament has the authority to decide 
on policy and legislation together with the Council of 
Ministers in most of the policy areas. Co-decision and 
assent procedures apply to most of the policy areas 
which give the Parliament a veto on passing legisla-
tive proposals (Nugent 2006: 243-244). Cooperation 
procedure also allows the Parliament to exert con-
siderable influence on the Council of Ministers (Nu-
gent 2006: 243). The important role of the European 
Parliament in decision-making is a manifestation of 
the Council of Ministers’ restricted power and the for-
mal authority of supranational institutions in the EU 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003: 291).
State-centric views perceive the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) as another agent of the member-states. 
However, the ECJ has an impartial multinational nature 
and has the authority to legally oblige the member-
states through the treaties. Since the treaties define 
‘tasks’ and ‘purposes’ for European cooperation e.g. 
Completion of the internal market (Single European 
Market), or in other words since there is a lack of preci-
sion in the EU’s statute law, the Court has played an 
expansive and interpretive role by specifying compe-
tencies of both intergovernmental and supranational 
institutions, (Marks et al., 1996: 354; Hooghe and Marks 
2003: 308; Nugent 2006: 289). An example the ECJ’s 
power is the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ case where the ruling by 
the Court has obliged the member-states to recognize 
any product that is produced and recognized in any 
other member-state (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 308-
309; Marks et al. 1996: 370). The constitutionalization 
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of EU treaties does not seem to comply with the pref-
erences of the national governments but is a product 
of the Court’s actions (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 293).
The Council of Ministers is arguably the most impor-
tant decision-making body of the EU (Nugent, 2006: 
192). It has the power to request the Commission 
to produce proposals and vote on legislations. Even 
though the Council of Ministers is comprised of na-
tional ministers defending their national interests, one 
can see that the application of the QMV limits the con-
trol of individual national governments (Obradovic 
1996: 202; Marks et al., 1996:350; Hooghe and Marks 
2003: 286). The QMV is used for decision-making for 
most of the issues (Auberger and Iszkowski 2007: 274; 
Hooghe and Marks 2003: 299). Although a serious 
blow to this principle has come by the 1966 Luxem-
bourg Compromise, the Luxembourg veto is not used 
since June 1985 (Marks et al. 1996: 362-363; Hooghe 
and Marks 2003: 299-300).
Apart from the Council of Ministers which has cer-
tain intergovernmental features, the European Coun-
cil is an intergovernmental institution. The European 
Council meets rarely and its decisions are mainly com-
prised of general policy frameworks to be set up by 
the Commission. This gives maneuverability to the 
Commission to create legislative programs (Marks et 
al 1996:357; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 296). 
Do the abovementioned factors have a coercive influ-
ence on member-states when maintaining their sov-
ereignty? Does the deficiency of military power at the 
EU level make the EU an intergovernmental organiza-
tion lacking major independence from the sovereign 
member-states? If member-states do not comply with 
the decisions that are being taken at the EU level or 
pull out of the EU, what can the EU do? One can ar-
gue that the traditional approach to state sovereignty, 
based on mere physical power cannot be applied to 
political control in the contemporary capitalist socie-
ties. It should not be forgotten that there are crucial 
economic and political sanctions and subsequent dis-
location that would maintain the order by inhibiting 
member-states on not following the EU rule (Marks 
et al., 1996:352; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 287; Scharpf 
2007: 16). 
A quick analyses of the institutions and the functioning 
of the EU demonstrates the fallacy of the state centric 
models, arguing that the national governments domi-
nate policy making and the supranational institutions 
are mere agents of the member-states (Beetham and 
Lord 1998b: 17; Hooghe and Marks 2003: 294). Inter-
governmental relations as well as supranational insti-
tutions make up the EU. It is crucial to understand that 
the EU is not comprised only of delegate institutions 
of the member-states and the member-states but it is 
an independent authority which has its own compe-
tencies (Wallace 2005: 493; Höreth 1999: 249-250; Au-
berger and Iszkowski 2007: 275; Eberlein and Grande 
2005: 91; Hooghe and Marks 2004: 19; Weale 1995: 83; 
Sand 1998: 280-282; Beetham and Lord 1998b: 17-19). 
Many of the decisions that affect the EU citizens’ lives 
are taken by the EU polity and these decisions have 
direct effect on the policies and political legitimacy of 
the nation-states (Dobson and Weale 2003: 159-160; 
Marks et al., 1996:342-343; Beetham and Lord 1998a: 
13-14; Beetham and Lord 1998a: 16; Beetham and 
Lord 1998b: 17-18).
Legitimacy of the EU
“Legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern” 
(Coicaud 2002:10). The governors possess power and 
it is only when the acquisition and exercise of power 
takes place according to justifiable rules and there is 
evidence of consent that we can call a power relation-
ship legitimate (Beetham 1991: 3). Legitimacy com-
prises of three different elements. Political power is 
legitimate, to the extent that:
t “It is acquired and exercised according to estab-
lished rules (legality); and
t the rules are justifiable according to socially ac-
cepted beliefs about (1) the rightful source and (2) the 
proper ends and standards of government (normative 
justifiability); and 
t positions of authority are confirmed by the ex-
press consent or affirmation on the part of appropri-
ate subordinates, and by recognition from other le-
gitimate authorities (legitimation) (Beetham and Lord, 
1998b:15).
The enhanced order, stability, and efficiency are the 
consequences of a legitimate system. A legitimate sys-
tem can be maintained easier since the maintenance 
of order presupposes obedient people who are sub-
ordinated to power (Beetham 1991: 33). The obedient 
subordinates make a regime stable since higher levels 
of support for the system mean that the regime will 
be resistant to economic crisis, political failures etc. 
(Beetham 1991: 33). This high support for the system 
allows the powerful to achieve their goals by enjoy-
ing high performance by the subordinates (Beetham 
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1991: 33; Rothstein 2003: 333). 
Moravcsik (2002) argues that the legitimacy of the EU 
can be assessed by using the same criteria used for 
international organizations. Nevertheless, the EU is a 
multilevel governance polity rather than an interna-
tional organization and the legitimation criteria used 
for international organization would not be fully ap-
plicable. Though not absolutely inapplicable, it is sim-
ply insufficient for fulfilling the legitimacy criteria of 
the EU (Beetham and Lord 1998a: 16; Ehin 2008: 834). 
International institutions acquire legitimacy through 
legitimate member-states or other institutions, not 
through citizens directly. Thus this type of legitimacy 
is indirect (Beetham and Lord 1998a: 11). This applies 
to the EU on occasions where the member states ne-
gotiate and ratify treaties without citizen participation, 
participate in decision-making process (recognition 
from other legitimate authorities), oblige to to rule of 
law in the EU created by the member states (legality), 
and try to establish and reach goals that are not pos-
sible to achieve individually (normative justifiability) 
(Beetham and Lord 1998a: 11-13).
Like Moravcsik (2002), Majone also falls in the trap of 
misperceiving the nature of the EU. Consequently, his 
assessment of the legitimacy of the EU is erred. Ma-
jone (1996a: 287) argues that the EU is a regulatory 
state since it has competences only in limited scope 
of social and economic regulation and its legitimacy 
should consequently be a regulatory legitimacy. He 
considers the administrative supranational institutions 
such as the Commission, the Court of Justice and the 
European Central Bank as ‘non-majoritarian institu-
tions’ meaning that they are not directly accountable 
to electors or elected officials (Majone 1996a: 285; 
Majone 1998: 15). Their legitimacy rather depends on 
performance than political accountability (Majone 
1996a: 285-286). Delegation of policy-making power 
to ‘non-majoritarian’ supranational institutions such as 
the European Commission is necessary since it is not 
possible to be sure that the agreements between the 
nations will adhered to without a monitoring agency 
(Majone 1996b: 617). Technocratic institutions are set 
up and their existence can be justified by the lack of 
expertise in solving complicated technical problems. 
Moreover, they allow policy continuity since they are 
less influenced by election results (Majone 1996b: 617). 
Majone differentiates between two types of legitimacy: 
“Procedural legitimacy implies, among other things, 
that the agencies are created by democratically enacted 
statutes which define the agencies’ legal authority and 
objectives; that the regulators are appointed by elected 
officials; that regulatory decision-making follows formal 
rules, which often require public participation; that agen-
cy decisions must be justified and are open to judicial re-
views” (Majone 1996a: 291). 
Substantive legitimacy on the other hand: 
“Relates to such features of the regulatory process as 
policy consistency, the expertise and problem-solving 
capacity of regulators, their ability to protect diffuse in-
terests and, most important, the precision of the limits 
within which regulators are expected to operate” (Ma-
jone 1996a: 291-292). 
Majone argues that procedural legitimacy of the EU 
can be improved by regulators giving reasons for their 
decisions; this will enable the EU to have transparency 
and accountability in decision-making (Majone 1996a: 
292-294; Majone 1998: 21). Substantive legitimacy can 
be improved if non majoritarian-institutions’ purposes 
are clearly defined (Majone 1996a: 294; Majone 1998: 
24). 
Looking at the substantive legitimacy, Majone (1996a: 
298-299) argues that the highly heterogeneous na-
ture of the EU does not allow the EU to take the equity 
side of the efficiency-equity tradeoff. A more active 
role of the EU in redistribution can only aggravate the 
legitimacy of the EU polity. As long as these non-ma-
joritarian institutions only deal with efficiency issues 
(maximization of aggregate welfare) rather than redis-
tributive issues (redistribution of income and wealth), 
which can only be decided by elected officials or ad-
ministrators accountable to elected officials because 
of the zero-sum nature of the redistributive policies, 
the non-majoritarian institutions can be legitimate 
(Majone 1996a: 294-295; Majone 1998: 28). In addition, 
the understanding of Madisonian type of democracy 
in Europe with serious cleavages would suggest that 
the majoritarian types of finding solutions for increas-
ing the legitimacy of the EU can only exacerbate its 
legitimacy (Majone 1996a: 287). Majone misses the 
point with his defense of regulatory legitimacy for 
the EU. It is one thing to defend the independence of 
regulatory bodies in a liberal democratic state where 
government is directly elected by ‘demos’, and anoth-
er to argue for an independent executive body influ-
encing the decisions both at the European and the 
domestic levels when this body is not directly elected 
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by a certain ‘demos’ or is not politically accountable to 
an elected body. Majoritarian or Madisonian, an unac-
countable executive branch, being a crucial actor in 
policy-initiation and implementation, creates prob-
lems for normative justification in a democratic pol-
ity (Hansen and Williams 1999: 245; Beetham and Lord 
1998a: 21; Rothstein 2003: 340). 
Majone’s perception of the EU and its legitimacy re-
duces the latter’s accountability. Political accountabili-
ty here is limited with mere reasoning of the decisions. 
Majone’s recipe for legitimacy is a good example for 
output legitimacy. Technocratic or (output) legitima-
cy is about policy outputs or delivering the needs of 
the society (Scharpf 1999; Höreth 1999: 251; Wimmel, 
2009:184,191; Dobson and Weale 2003: 160). How-
ever, the EU policy competencies have exceeded the 
competencies of a regulatory state. Reducing the le-
gitimacy of the EU governance to only technocratic 
legitimacy cannot be normatively justified in a demo-
cratic society (Auberger and Iszkowski 2007: 274; Win-
cott 2006: 762; Höreth 1999: 261; Beetham and Lord 
1998a: 22).
The EU is neither controlled by the member-states nor 
is it a regulatory state. The EU is a model of multi-level 
governance which influences the policies and the le-
gitimacy of liberal democratic states. Thus, one should 
follow the way of reasoning that raises the stakes and 
obliges the EU to comply with the legitimacy criteria 
that are used to assess the legitimacy of liberal-dem-
ocratic states. The EU can fulfill the legitimacy criteria 
only by ensuring that it conforms to legality, norma-
tive justifiability, and legitimation that is used for liberal 
democratic states (Beetham and Lord 1998a: 22; Ehin 
2008: 634). However, this does not mean that fulfilling 
these criteria will be achieved by the same methods 
that are used for liberal democratic states (Schmitter 
2007: 5; Vink 2007: 317-319; Scott 2009: 172; Georgiev 
2008: 111). Neither does it mean that indirect legiti-
macy that is appropriate for the international organi-
zations should be replaced by the liberal-democratic 
criteria. They can indeed be complementary. Direct 
and indirect legitimacy coexist together for the legiti-
mation of the EU polity: the so-called ‘double legiti-
macy’ (Dehousse 1995: 22-26). The task is to find spe-
cific means to acquire legitimacy by both direct and 
indirect methods that are available for the EU-polity 
(Beetham and Lord 1998a: 23). 
The first element of normative justifiability for liberal-
democracies is performance. Performance can be 
used interchangeably with technocratic legitimacy 
which solely depends on efficiency and effectiveness 
without democratic procedures. The second element 
is democracy that encompasses accountability, elec-
toral authorization of government and representation, 
as these ensure that the source of political authority 
lies only with the people (Beetham and Lord 1998a: 
6; Beetham and Lord 1998b: 16; Dobson and Weale 
2003: 160). Popular sovereignty also requires that peo-
ple as the source of political authority are clearly de-
fined, thus identity is the third element (Hansen and 
Williams 1999: 236; Wimmel, 2009:190; Beetham and 
Lord 1998a: 6; Beetham and Lord 1998b: 16). The le-
gality criterion in liberal democracies depends on the 
constitutional rule of law and the legitimation crite-
rion in liberal democracies depends on the consent 
subsumed in electoral authorisation and recognition 
by other legitimate authorities (Beetham and Lord 
1998a: 5, 7-8; Beetham and Lord 1998b: 16). Table 2 
shows the criteria for assessing normative justifiability, 
legality and legitimation in liberal-democracies.
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Normative Justifiability Legality Legitimation
Performance Constitutional rule of law Consent subsumed in electoral authorisation 
Accountability, Electoral 
authorisation of government and  
Representation
(Democracy)
- Recognition by other legitimate authorites
Identity - -    
Table 1 - Legitimacy of Liberal Democracies
Source: Author’s own compilation.
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Another crucial point is that ‘the legitimacy of political 
authority in Europe is now a two-level process, which 
cannot be analyzed at one level but only as a process 
of interaction between the EU and its member-states’ 
(Beetham and Lord 1998a: 30; Beetham and Lord 
1998b: 18; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 8). This is due 
to the legitimacy deficits under identity, democracy 
and performance having different consequences on 
2 The question marks in the table represents the view 
that not all the methods that can be used for increasing the le-
gitimacy of the EU is known to us since fulfilling the legitimation 
criteria does not need to be identical with the liberal-democratic 
states. 
The double sided arrow between the legitimacy of the EU and 
specific member-state notifies the reader of three things: 1) The 
legitimacy of the EU and the changes made towards the legiti-
macy of the EU affect each member-state differently. 2) This spe-
cific effect makes specific changes in the legitimacy of the EU 
depending on which member-state is exposed to this effect, as 
each country would conceive the effect of the legitimacy of the 
EU in a different way. 3) The legitimacy of the EU is affected by 
the legitimacy of the member-states as the EU also depends on 
indirect legitimacy acquired through the member-states.
the member-states and their legitimacy (Jachtenfuchs 
et al. 1998: 433; Beetham and Lord 1998a: 30-31). Dif-
fering perceptions of legitimacy of the EU among the 
member-states and varying effects of the legitimacy 
of the EU on different member-states also cause vary-
ing impact on the legitimacy of the EU. Table 3 gives 
a conceptual framework for assessing the legitimacy 
of the EU.
is an ‘intergovernmental organization’ or a ‘regulatory 
state’. The author argued that the weakness of these 
authors’ arguments emanates from their impaired 
understanding of the nature of the EU which hinders 
correct assessment of the EU’s legitimacy. The author 
stated that analyzing the EU from a multilevel govern-
ance perspective should point to the researchers that 
Beetham and Lord’s (1998a) theoretical framework is 
currently the most applicable for the assessment of the 
legitimacy of the EU. The EU is a multilevel polity that 
influences the legitimacy of its member-states. The 
EU is obliged to meet the same criteria that liberal de-
mocracies have to meet. These criteria are democracy, 
performance, identity (normative justifiability), rule of 
law (legality), electoral authorization and recognition 
by other legal authorities (legitimation). However, one 
should note that indirect legitimacy, relevant to inter-
national organizations, can coexist with the EU’s direct 
legitimacy and can be complementary. In addition, 
any assessment of the legitimacy of the EU should 
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Table 2 - Multi-Level Governance Legitimacy of 
the EU: A Conceptual Framework 2
Source: Author’s own compilation.
Conclusion
 This article reviewed the literature to find ap-
plicable standards for the assessment of the EU’s legit-
imacy. This article has analysed different arguments, 
discussed the flaws of the ones arguing that the EU 
is not in need of democratic legitimation because it 
take into account the interaction between the EU and 
the member-states. Legitimacy of the EU affects each 
member-state differently and different understandings 
of legitimacy of the EU among the member states and 
the different effects of the former on the member-states 
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As the year draws to an end, all eyes in the Western 
Balkans turn somewhat nervously towards Brussels 
and the European Commission’s annual Enlargement 
Strategy and Progress Report. This year, results were 
rather mixed, but the Commission attempted to stress 
the positive aspects. According to the Commission, in 
general, this past year has witnessed ‘new momentum’ 
in the enlargement process, and important milestones
were achieved. From December, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Albania will join the visa liberalisation regime 
(implemented in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
in December 2009), showing that even the laggards 
can meet the required standards when the condi-
tions are clear and the incentives compelling.Monte-
negro is ready to become an official EU candidate in 
December. Serbia’s application for EU membership, 
submitted in December 2009, has now been sent to 
the Commission, which is expected to issue a formal 
‘opinion’ and recommendation to EU member states 
before the end of 2011. Serbia not only hopes to be 
granted candidate status (like Macedonia, and shortly 
Montenegro), but also expects the opening of imme-
diate accession negotiations.
Croatia, commended for ‘steady progress’, has re-
sumed accession talks, which are now at a ‘final stage’ 
after several months of stagnation due to a border dis-
pute with Slovenia. This, if not yet resolved, would be 
dealt with bilaterally according to an agreed process 
that should not affect Croatia’s EU entry. If talks pro-
ceed without further hitches, the Accession Treaty will 
be ready for signature sometime in the second half of 
2011. Accession will follow about a year later, once all 
member states have ratified the treaty.This will repre-
sent a landmark for the enlargement process.
For the Commission, Croatia’s future accession shows 
the remaining countries of the region that they too 
could enjoy the same prospects provided they fulfil 
the required conditions. This should encourage addi-
tional efforts in the Western Balkans to speed up the 
pace of reform.
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quality of the process, building popular trust in political elites and institutions, and enhancing mutual understanding 
between the EU and theWestern Balkans.
Nonetheless, concerns abound that the EU’s preoc-
cupation with its huge internal problems, especially 
regarding the euro’s legitimacy in the face of the 
threat of economic meltdown in Greece, Ireland and 
possibly other member states, could further diminish 
the Union’s enthusiasm for enlargement towards the 
Balkans. Thus, Croatia’s accession could be the last for 
many years, perhaps a decade or more. But govern-
ments in the Western Balkans need a much faster pace 
of integration if they are to be motivated to sell tough
reforms to weary electorates.
Dreams postponed
The sober reality is that several years need to pass be-
fore the remaining aspirants in the Western Balkans 
region are able to join. And it is not just a question 
of how many years it will take the EU to overcome its 
current economic woes, regain confidence and turn 
its attention back to its unfinished business in the Bal-
kans. There are practical, technical limits too, as well 
as longstanding weaknesses in theWestern Balkans 
states that need to be addressed. 
Thus, if Serbia, for example, which is often cited as the 
most administratively capable among the remaining 
states of the region, were indeed invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations in, let’s say, early 2012, it is hard 
to imagine it concluding them much faster than Croa-
tia. This would
imply a realistic accession date of 2019–20. But Serbia 
still has to deal with two specific political challenges 
before being deemed fit to enter accession talks: first, 
capturing indicted war criminals, and second, better 
cooperation with the EU over Kosovo.
While the Netherlands agreed in October that Serbia’s 
membership application could be forwarded to the 
Commission for consideration, it still insists on Serbia 
handing over indicted war criminals Ratko Mladic and 
Goran Hadzic to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) before allowing any 
further steps towards EU membership. Most mem-
ber states felt that Serbia deserved to be rewarded 
for dropping its confrontational stance over Kosovo. 
At the United Nations in September, President Tadic 
finally took the reins back from his abrasive young for-
eign minister, Vuk Jeremic, and agreed to a joint EU-
Serbia resolution that committed Serbia to dialogue 
with Kosovo without reopening the status question. 
In recognition of the Netherlands’ flexibility over Ser-
bia’s membership application, the EU reiterated (to 
the Netherlands satisfaction) that ‘full cooperation’ 
with the ICTY – meaning delivery of the indicted war 
criminals – was a sine qua non condition to gaining 
candidate status. President Tadic has therefore one 
year to solve the question that has long bedevilled 
Serbia’s European prospects and that, if unattended 
to, will block Serbia’s otherwise quite good chances of 
securing candidate status in 2011.
Unfortunately, the latest report on Serbia’s perfor-
mance in this respect, to be delivered in December 
to the United Nations by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge 
Brammertz, will not be encouraging. In recent state-
ments, Brammertz declared that, as late as 2006, Ser-
bia’s security forces deliberately missed the chance 
of arresting Mladic. The current Serbian war crimes 
prosecutor, Vladimir Vukcevic, admitted as much in 
a press interview in November. The main problem is 
that Serbia’s political leaders are still unable effectively 
to control the security forces responsible for arresting 
the fugitives. Similarly, they seem to lack the courage 
to confront key individuals firmly ensconced in those 
forces, who are allegedly connected to the shadowy 
Serbian underworld that assassinated former Prime 
Minister Zoran Dzindzic when he started to pose seri-
ous challenges.
In addition, there is the still uncertain course of the Ko-
sovo dialogue scheduled to begin early next year. At 
present, Kosovo’s leaders are the ones who are drag-
ging their feet, having called for early elections in De-
cember after the fall of the government in Pristina – 
much to the EU’s frustration, as it wanted talks to start 
straight away. In the meantime, however, Serbia has to 
start preparing its answers to the questionnaire that 
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele delivered to 
Belgrade on 24 November. The questionnaire includes
thousands of detailed questions on all aspects of Ser-
bia’s policy-making, administrative and regulatory 
structures, legislative framework and laws relevant to 
its EU bid. It is on this basis that the Commission will 
produce its opinion and its recommendation on Ser-
bia’s application. 
Although Serbia had started working on draft an-
swers to the anticipated questionnaire long before 
the application was submitted, there is no doubt that, 
in many fields, Serbia’s insistence on Kosovo being a 
part of Serbia will greatly complicate matters. What 
may seem narrow, technical questions could rapidly 
lead to political minefields that the technocrats of the 
European Integration Office will have to throw onto 
the overloaded desks of their political masters. These 
might prove hard to handle as the electoral cycle ap-
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proaches, with both president and parliament reach-
ing the limits of their terms in early 2012.
Even if these political time bombs can be sidestepped,
the Commission’s latest Progress Report on Serbia 
points out just how much still has to be done with re-
gard to the ‘normal’ reform agenda if the country is to 
be granted candidate status. Having read the previous 
progress reports, the Commission’s critical tone this 
year is unsurprising. Serbia has failed to address long-
standing weaknesses, particularly in the judicial field.
The general opinion that Serbia has developed an 
‘administrative capacity’ is only true in comparison 
with its neighbours, but still falls short of the stand-
ards required by the EU. Public administration reform 
and the fight against organised crime and corruption 
require ‘additional efforts’ too. Only ‘limited progress’ 
has been made in turning Serbia into a ‘functioning 
market economy’, and structural reforms, privatisa-
tion and labour market reforms have been postponed 
again this year. 
So much energy and attention has been consumed 
on the Kosovo issue that nitty-gritty issues have been 
neglected. And just as the government seemed ready 
to focus on EU integration, it was knocked down by 
the severe impact of the European economic and fi-
nancial crisis and has had to turn to the International 
Monetary Fund. In other words, Serbia needs more 
time to handle its formidable political agenda: to di-
gest the loss of Kosovo; unravel the sinister tentacles 
of the ‘deep state’ that stunt its democracy; overhaul 
the judiciary and the state administration in order to 
entrench the rule of law; and advance with the transi-
tion to a market economy. All this amidst a deep eco-
nomic crisis and dim prospects for foreign investment 
and assistance inflows.
If we look at Macedonia, we can also see the limits to 
accelerating the EU’s integration process. Macedonia 
gained EU candidate status in December 2005. This 
was done somewhat ‘prematurely’, some would ar-
gue, given that the country was then in much poor-
er shape in technical, administrative and economic 
terms than Serbia is today. The decision was political 
and belonged to a reward package for implementing
the politically difficult Ohrid Agreement that settled 
the terms of peaceful coexistence between Macedo-
nia’s ethnic Macedonians (Slavs) and its sizeable Al-
banian minority after the country narrowly avoided 
civil war in 2001. Nevertheless, political stability in 
Macedonia remains fragile, and political life polarised 
not only along ethnic lines but also within the ethnic 
communities themselves. Although Macedonia has 
worked hard and made huge progress (for example, 
the country has for several years been near the top of
the World Bank’s rankings of improvers of business 
conditions), at times reform has been hostage to 
wider political struggles. For some time, Macedonia 
argued that it was ready to begin accession negotia-
tions, and indeed, needed to begin them in order to 
keep politics on track
– a telling reversal of the normal logic of conditionality 
that rewards states for keeping themselves on track.
In its 2009 Progress Report the Commission support-
ed Macedonia’s readiness to embark on accession ne-
gotiations, but domestic politics has become increas-
ingly poisoned by the protracted
– and increasingly bizarre – dispute with Greece over 
the country’s name and the language spoken by the 
Slavic majority. Festering since the very emergence of 
the state itself back in 1991, the dispute now blocks 
Macedonia’s accession to both NATO and the EU, due 
to Greece’s veto. This, in turn, frustrates the Albanians, 
for whom the name issue is a symbolic matter of no 
significance and who consider NATO and EU integra-
tion a priority. The government, increasingly dominat-
ed by strident – and popular – Macedonian national-
ists, has been adding fuel to the fire. It has embarked 
on an extravagant programme to rebuild the centre of 
Skopje that includes a gigantic, central statue of Alex-
ander the Great. This not only inflames Greek outrage
at the ‘expropriation’ of what they see as essentially 
Greek cultural heritage, but also infuriates Albanians 
and the Macedonian opposition who see it as a wilful 
squandering of scarce resources.
In this year’s report, in a heroic understatement the 
Commission notes the need to ‘strengthen political di-
alogue’ and desist from ‘actions and statements which 
could adversely affect good neighbourly relations’. Al-
though the Commission continues to back Macedo-
nia’s hopes to begin entry talks, it also underlines that 
reforms have continued ‘at an uneven pace’ in the past 
year. There remains a lengthy state building agenda
before Macedonia fully meets EU membership ob-
ligations. Thus, while Greece’s behaviour towards 
Macedonia shocks most of its European partners, the 
Macedonian government is far from innocent. How-
ever, even if this political spat were to melt away and 
Macedonia began accession negotiations next year, 
for instance, state weakness and politico-institutional 
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Good things come to those who wait
Sustaining the momentum of EU enlargement is 
clearly vital to consolidating peace and security in the 
Western Balkans, but the onerous process of preparing 
for EU accession cannot be rushed. Excessive pressure 
can also strain democratic institutions and democratic 
practices in weak states in transition. Harmonising the 
vast array of laws, regulations and policies with the 
EU’s acquis – now approaching some 100,000 pages 
– almost inevitably leads to short-cuts in the demo-
cratic process, leaving little scope or time for serious 
parliamentary debate and scrutiny. This can reinforce 
the already strong tendency in leader-dominated po-
litical cultures to concentrate power in the hands of 
the government, and to centralise control within a 
narrow elite.
The argument that ‘there is no alternative’ to the dic-
tates of the EU is open to exploitation by governments
that are frequently intolerant towards civil society 
criticism and exercise an iron rule over their party sup-
porters through their extensive powers of patronage. 
Laws drafted in excessive haste by overworked legal 
experts, sometimes by simply cutting and pasting 
fromEU templates, often turn out to be incompatible 
with existing laws, requiring frequent amendments 
and revisions. All this generates a sense of legal insta-
bility that hardly contributes to strengthening the rule 
of law.
It also has several implications for the development 
of a wider democratic political culture. While for the 
region the strategic importance of joining the EU is 
clear, the European Union can loom almost too large 
in domestic politics, eclipsing the equally important 
challenge of strengthening the democratic account-
ability of political leaders and the population’s trust in 
political institutions. Successive opinion polls conducted 
by the Gallup Balkan Monitor (www.balkan-monitor.eu) 
reveal the very low level of popular trust in govern-
ments, parliaments, political parties and the judiciary. 
In most states of the region, vast majorities profess to 
have ‘only a little trust’ or ‘no trust at all’ in their govern-
ment.
What people want to see is greater effort to bring 
about immediate, tangible improvements in their eve-
ryday standards of living and employment prospects. 
EU integration, a dominant question during election 
time, offers no quick fix here, yet competing party pro-
grammes rarely address these issues with clear and 
practical, alternative policies. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that approximately twothirds of citizens in Serbia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Macedonia say that no poli-
tician or political party really represents their views. 
The EU could be an important ally for domestic civil 
society in the region, by providing relatively impartial 
information on governments’ performance and sup-
porting capacity-development. However, NGOs also 
need to build strong and extensive roots in the wider 
society in general, which remains a passive and scepti-
cal observer of the EU’s integration processes.
How can the European Union maintain the credibility 
of the ‘EU perspective’ in the region? The EU’s own poor 
performance in this respect is widely acknowledged, 
but further transparency and realism are also needed 
with regard to the challenges facing the Western Bal-
kans over the next decade. The Greek foreign minister 
recently floated again the idea of setting a clear acces-
sion timetable for the rest of the region after Croatia’s
accession. But there is still strong resistance in Brussels 
and many member state capitals, which are mindful 
of the political pressures raised by the arguably pre-
mature accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
But more important than the timing of accession it-
self, is the effectiveness of the reforms carried out in 
the years preceding that. In the coming years, the EU 
needs to get over its introversion and redouble its ef-
forts to support such reforms, engage with more de-
termination in ‘member state building’, especially in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and improve its 
communication with the general public both in the 
region and at home. In the economic field, the EU 
should allocate more resources to development and 
growth, not just the implementation of the acquis, tai-
lored mainly to the needs of much more prosperous
and sophisticated economies.
In the interim, the abolition of the visa regime for 
the Balkans this year is perhaps the most promis-
ing and significant gesture that the EU could make. 
EU support for ‘people-to-people’ exchanges must 
now expand so that citizens in the Western Balkans 
can more easily experience the European way of 
life. They may indeed find it sobering, but this is 
no bad thing if it entails a more realistic, down-to-
earth, and solid understanding of what they can 
expect of the EU, and what they must demand of 








(IdPS) is the !rst Italian English-language graduate journal in political studies 
launched by the CiRCAP,  University of Siena and the SIS, University of Trento. 
IdPS is published three times a year at http://www.idps.unisi.it
Though submissions are reviewed on rolling basis, the journal currently accepts submissions
 for its second issue to be published in June with the deadline of 7 March. 
In case of interest please send manuscripts of articles, policy briefs or commentaries to 
idps.journal@unisi.it  For more information please visit the Submissions page of our website 
http://www.idps.unisi.it
IdPS Editors
Stefano Braghiroli and Nelli Babayan
